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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 573<br />

activities so <strong>the</strong>re may be independent consideration of sensitivities, implications and additional<br />

coordination requirements of a public, international, governmental, congressional<br />

or industry affairs character. The system should not be designed to delay or screen activities<br />

but ra<strong>the</strong>r to permit “flagging” problems on a timely basis if <strong>the</strong>y should be perceived.<br />

Cost-benefit analysis may be <strong>the</strong> appropriate tool for evaluating some applications.<br />

Before resources are committed to doing such studies, <strong>the</strong> criteria noted under <strong>the</strong> paragraph<br />

above on Space Applications should be considered. But <strong>the</strong>re is a continuing need<br />

for such cost-benefit studies for many potential projects. Traditionally <strong>the</strong>se studies have<br />

been done by <strong>the</strong> various program offices. As more are done, <strong>the</strong>re is a need for uniform<br />

techniques to be applied to cost-benefit analysis so that <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> various studies<br />

can be compared. These criteria should be determined by a central office and <strong>the</strong>n<br />

applied with <strong>the</strong> assistance of <strong>the</strong> various program offices or field centers.<br />

– International. The Space Act mandates a program of international cooperation,<br />

and <strong>the</strong> Outer Space Treaty calls for <strong>the</strong> sharing of <strong>the</strong> benefits of space activity. There is<br />

no requirement to transfer technology itself abroad.<br />

The options are to conduct “give-away” or support and aid-type programs or to seek<br />

cost-sharing or o<strong>the</strong>r economic return. Until <strong>the</strong> Landsat program, <strong>the</strong> precedents established<br />

for cooperative programs were generous, but most often were subjected to requirements<br />

of scientific validity and mutual interest.<br />

[19] Thus, in <strong>the</strong> first experimentation with communications satellites, foreign states were<br />

permitted to participate in <strong>the</strong> testing phase (not <strong>the</strong> R&D) on <strong>the</strong> basis that <strong>the</strong>y funded<br />

<strong>the</strong> necessary overseas ground stations. NASA <strong>the</strong>reby saved <strong>the</strong> expense of funding facilities<br />

at both ends of <strong>the</strong> experiments. Even in <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite field, <strong>the</strong> initial cooperation<br />

entailed comparison flights by foreign aircraft coordinated with spacecraft passes<br />

and o<strong>the</strong>r activities designed to help calibrate and validate <strong>the</strong> first satellite data analyses.<br />

Landsat. In <strong>the</strong> Landsat case, it was felt that a peculiarly economic application was<br />

involved and that cost-sharing for <strong>the</strong> space segment should be established in principle.<br />

(The foreign users, of course, fund all <strong>the</strong>ir ground-based facilities and activities.) Before<br />

cost-sharing was even broached, however, NASA’s agreement to program Landsats to read<br />

out for foreign stations was offset by several quid-pro-quos: <strong>the</strong> foreign stations undertook<br />

to supply data free to [principal investigators] selected by NASA; <strong>the</strong>y were obligated to<br />

provide data of interest to NASA on request; and <strong>the</strong>y represented valuable insurance to<br />

NASA for desired foreign coverage when <strong>the</strong> spacecraft tape recorders should fail.<br />

Technology transfer, in <strong>the</strong> sense of industrial know-how, is not involved in <strong>the</strong> above<br />

Landsat type foreign involvement. Here we are speaking more of <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong> benefits<br />

of a technology, but some transfers of data processing and analysis know-how are<br />

required by training personnel. NASA does not operate training programs as such,<br />

although limited on-<strong>the</strong>-job training opportunities are made available under certain conditions.<br />

Industry and [<strong>the</strong> Agency for International Development], along with o<strong>the</strong>r specialized<br />

government agencies, often provide training services.<br />

FEDD. The options are whe<strong>the</strong>r to continue to try to control unclassified technical<br />

outputs by NASA and its contractors or not, and if so, whe<strong>the</strong>r through <strong>the</strong> FEDD program<br />

or ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />

[20] The arguments for control are <strong>the</strong>se: NASA has been criticized for its large output of<br />

technical information available to foreign competitors. The circumstances of release of<br />

supercritical wing information at least suggested that major innovations with significant<br />

military and/or commercial potential might be compromised and that professional motivation<br />

and tradition may operate to obscure <strong>the</strong> national interest. The fact that public<br />

funds are used to underwrite such R&D would, with o<strong>the</strong>r factors, seem to require some<br />

regard for <strong>the</strong> national interest.

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