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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 159<br />

This was <strong>the</strong> first hurricane to be identified by a satellite before being observed by <strong>the</strong>nconventional<br />

means.<br />

Even before <strong>the</strong>se successes, <strong>the</strong> usefulness of <strong>the</strong> TIROS satellites led to pressure to<br />

transform <strong>the</strong> experimental project into an operational system. To address this issue,<br />

NASA called toge<strong>the</strong>r an interagency Panel on Operational Meteorological Satellites in<br />

October 1960. Disagreements over <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> program quickly appeared. The<br />

Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau sought more control than NASA wanted to give up; it asked for complete<br />

authority over <strong>the</strong> operational system, including launching, data retrieval, and final decisions<br />

on <strong>the</strong> design of new operational satellites. [II-4]<br />

The panel issued a compromise plan in April 1961 calling for a national operational<br />

meteorological satellite system (based on a second-generation satellite already under<br />

development by NASA) to be managed by <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau. 19 This plan did not go as<br />

far as <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau had originally proposed; NASA would maintain control of<br />

launch services and ground support and would develop and procure spacecraft under<br />

contract to <strong>the</strong> Department of Commerce (of which <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau was a part).<br />

President Kennedy’s May 25, 1961, speech to Congress titled “Urgent National Needs,” in<br />

which he urged funding a program to land an American on <strong>the</strong> Moon before <strong>the</strong> end of<br />

<strong>the</strong> decade, also requested funds to put <strong>the</strong> wea<strong>the</strong>r satellite plan into operation. Congress<br />

approved <strong>the</strong> funding Kennedy had requested, despite continuing controversy over what<br />

would be <strong>the</strong> best division of responsibility between NASA and <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau for<br />

operating <strong>the</strong> system. 20<br />

Meanwhile, NASA was working on <strong>the</strong> second-generation meteorological satellite,<br />

Nimbus, as a prototype for <strong>the</strong> operational system. Nimbus was a more sophisticated<br />

spacecraft than TIROS—stabilized so that it always pointed toward <strong>the</strong> Earth ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />

continuously rotating. It was to be launched into a Sun-synchronous polar orbit so that it<br />

could collect data from <strong>the</strong> whole Earth at <strong>the</strong> same local time each day. The satellite<br />

would carry not only more sophisticated television cameras, but also a high-resolution<br />

infrared radiometer that used <strong>the</strong>rmal infrared sensors to map temperature. (A simpler<br />

experimental sensor of <strong>the</strong> same type had been carried on later TIROS flights.) Plans for<br />

Nimbus also included a variety of more sophisticated sensors—most significantly, sounding<br />

instruments providing data that could be used to determine temperatures at various<br />

levels in <strong>the</strong> atmosphere. 21 These new instruments reflected <strong>the</strong> efforts of NASA scientists<br />

to meet <strong>the</strong> continuing demand from research meteorologists for basic numerical data in<br />

addition to cloud images. 22<br />

While researchers wanted <strong>the</strong> more sophisticated data Nimbus would provide, <strong>the</strong><br />

Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau became concerned about its increasing cost and delays in launch. NASA<br />

and <strong>the</strong> Wea<strong>the</strong>r Bureau also had differing perspectives on what decisions should be made<br />

about <strong>the</strong> operational system and on which agency should make <strong>the</strong>m. 23 This became a<br />

19. U.S. National Coordinating Committee for Aviation Meteorology, Panel of Operational<br />

Meteorological Satellites, Plan for a National Operational Meteorological Satellite System (Washington, DC: U.S.<br />

Government Printing <strong>Office</strong>, 1961).<br />

20. These issues are discussed in “The National Meteorological Program,” preliminary staff report of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Committee on Science and Astronautics, 87th Cong., 1st sess., July 13, 1961. For a discussion of <strong>the</strong> process<br />

of approving <strong>the</strong> plan, see Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, United States<br />

Civilian Space Programs: Volume II, Applications Satellites, report prepared for <strong>the</strong> Subcommittee on Space Science<br />

and Applications, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st sess., May 1983, pp. 198–99; Chapman, “A Case<br />

Study,” pp. 107–27.<br />

21. Chapman, “A Case Study,” p. 161.<br />

22. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> Nimbus series continued through Nimbus 7 and provided <strong>the</strong> basic information needed<br />

to develop later research satellite systems, including <strong>the</strong> Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite and <strong>the</strong> Earth<br />

Observing System. H.F. Eden, B.P. Elero, and J.N. Perkins, “Nimbus Satellites: Setting <strong>the</strong> Stage for Mission to<br />

Planet Earth,” EOS, Transactions, American Geophysical Union 74 (June 29, 1993): 281, 285.

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