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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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150<br />

THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS<br />

Government should not stifle private entrepreneurial initiatives absent sound and<br />

compelling public policy reasons. Such initiatives should not be discouraged when <strong>the</strong> services<br />

proposed could prove of value to customers, improve <strong>the</strong>ir productivity and efficiency,<br />

and thus enable American firms to compete more effectively both at home and<br />

abroad. The public policy case for continuing <strong>the</strong> status quo and flatly prohibiting additional<br />

international satellite systems is weak. Simply <strong>the</strong> pendency of U.S. applications has<br />

caused INTELSAT to accelerate plans for special business-oriented services and has precipitated<br />

a beneficial review of competitive conditions in <strong>the</strong> international satellite field<br />

generally. Fur<strong>the</strong>r study and inevitable delay are unlikely to yield public dividends commensurate<br />

with <strong>the</strong> economic costs imposed.<br />

[52] It is <strong>the</strong> view of <strong>the</strong> Executive branch that <strong>the</strong> national interest will be fur<strong>the</strong>red by<br />

approving additional international communications satellite systems subject to limitations<br />

designed to minimize adverse effects on INTELSAT. Specifically, additional systems<br />

should be restricted to providing services through <strong>the</strong> sale or long-term lease of transponders<br />

or space segment capacity for communications not interconnected with publicswitched<br />

message networks (except for emergency restoration service). Consultation must<br />

be undertaken with INTELSAT pursuant to Article XIV(d) of <strong>the</strong> Definitive Agreement.<br />

[53] Appendix A<br />

[54] THE WHITE HOUSE<br />

WASHINGTON<br />

November 28, 1984<br />

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE<br />

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE<br />

Presidential Determination<br />

No. 85-2<br />

By virtue of <strong>the</strong> authority vested in me by <strong>the</strong> Constitution and statutes of <strong>the</strong> United<br />

States, including Sections 102(d) and 201(a) of <strong>the</strong> Communications Satellite Act of 1962,<br />

as amended (47 U.S.C. 701(d), 721 (a)), I hereby determine that separate international<br />

communications satellite systems are required in <strong>the</strong> national interest. The United States,<br />

in order to meet its obligations under <strong>the</strong> Agreement Establishing <strong>the</strong> International<br />

Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) (TIAS 7532), shall consult with<br />

INTELSAT regarding such separate systems as are authorized by <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />

Communications Commission. You are directed jointly to inform <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />

Communications Commission of criteria necessary to ensure <strong>the</strong> United States meets its<br />

international obligations and to fur<strong>the</strong>r its telecommunications and foreign policy interests.<br />

This determination shall be published in <strong>the</strong> Federal Register.<br />

[hand-signed: “Ronald Reagan”]

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