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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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[28] 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

It is concluded that it is technically feasible, within <strong>the</strong> present state of <strong>the</strong> art of rocket<br />

and electronic technology, to establish a commercial 24-hour communication satellite<br />

using <strong>the</strong> Scout rocket vehicle. It is recommended that NASA encourage such a program<br />

and recognize it as an important new application of <strong>the</strong> Scout. This program can be<br />

accomplished by <strong>the</strong> Hughes Aircraft Company within a year at a cost of 5 million dollars.<br />

Document I-6<br />

Document title: “Memorandum for Conference on Communications Satellite<br />

Development,” December 7, 1960.<br />

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA Headquarters,<br />

Washington, D.C.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> closing months of <strong>the</strong> Eisenhower administration, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan and<br />

his associates paid much attention to <strong>the</strong> appropriate relationship between government and <strong>the</strong> private<br />

sector in <strong>the</strong> development of communications satellites. AT&T’s active interest in trying to establish<br />

a leading position in this new technology stimulated Glennan and his colleagues to focus on this<br />

issue. This memorandum, with no credited author, but almost certainly prepared by Robert Nunn,<br />

Glennan’s special assistant for communications satellites, summarizes <strong>the</strong> situation as of December<br />

1960.<br />

[1]<br />

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 39<br />

Memorandum for Conference on<br />

Communications Satellite Development<br />

December 7, 1960<br />

1. Basic Mutual Recognition<br />

a. AT&T uniquely has <strong>the</strong> greatest and most obvious private business interest in<br />

satellites because of its overseas telephone business.<br />

b. O<strong>the</strong>r companies have expressed varying degrees of interest in and shown<br />

varying degrees of initiative with respect to participation in <strong>the</strong> development<br />

of elements of a communication satellite system, although none has given evidence<br />

of desiring to spend company funds in substantial amounts as has<br />

AT&T.<br />

c. NASA alone has <strong>the</strong> statutory responsibility to <strong>the</strong> nation for developing<br />

space technology and facilitating its civil application to communications.<br />

d. It follows that all <strong>the</strong>se respective interests must be harmonized on a common<br />

ground.<br />

[handwritten notes in margin: “1) May - June 1961 - firm up our coop. utilization of A’s,”<br />

“2) Obtain assurance of A-participation in comm.,” and “3) NASA must preserve bid n<br />

(and) competition.”]<br />

2. Common Ground<br />

a. Nei<strong>the</strong>r AT&T nor NASA should pre-empt <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s central area of responsibility<br />

and competence.

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