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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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290<br />

OBSERVING THE EARTH FROM SPACE<br />

vide new or improved responses to hi<strong>the</strong>rto inadequate service availability.<br />

We consider that <strong>the</strong>re are unique attributes of remote sensing systems, and that <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

utility resides in a complex mix of: (1) direct benefits presumably quantifiable by<br />

conventional cost benefit analysis, and perhaps less direct benefits accruing from<br />

an increased tax base resulting from new ventures prompted by <strong>the</strong> availability of<br />

remote sensing services and products; (2) general benefits for [9] better decision<br />

making by informed societies; (3) <strong>the</strong> payoffs to <strong>the</strong> public good by basic investments<br />

in information services; and (4) in some cases, by fundamental structural<br />

changes in economic and social welfare not capturable [sic] by conventional cost<br />

benefit analysis (e.g., here a general equilibrium approach is relevant, vice <strong>the</strong> simpler<br />

and much less encompassing cost benefit assessments).<br />

We believe that <strong>the</strong>re is both merit in and opportunities for additional analyses by<br />

which <strong>the</strong> utility, in <strong>the</strong> broadest sense, of remote sensing systems can better be<br />

measured, particularly in <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> latter three factors of <strong>the</strong> preceding paragraph.<br />

For <strong>the</strong> immediate future, decisions to pursue remote sensing must in part<br />

be founded on intuitively based social and political rationales. The current lack<br />

of fully quantifiable utility assessments does not outweigh <strong>the</strong> preponderance of<br />

evidence that remote sensing systems should be pursued.<br />

4. Consequences of not continuing. The consultants have also considered <strong>the</strong> implications<br />

of alternative U.S. policy attitudes, e.g., a decision not to continue indefinitely a U.S.<br />

involvement in civil remote sensing or a decision to defer still longer <strong>the</strong> making of a decision<br />

on a continuing future U.S. involvement.<br />

a. A decision not to continue would mean loss of <strong>the</strong> benefits and opportunities that<br />

are <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> favorable assessment given above. The consultants believe that<br />

<strong>the</strong> potential of many of <strong>the</strong>se benefits is widely recognized both in <strong>the</strong> U.S. and<br />

abroad. Any U.S. policy implying or presaging U.S. withdrawal, now or in <strong>the</strong><br />

future, from an active role in civil remote sensing from space would undoubtedly<br />

be met by <strong>the</strong> early development of foreign systems designed to meet U.S. as<br />

well as foreign needs. The consultants believe that such a loss of benefits, opportunities,<br />

and U.S. leadership is unacceptable.<br />

b. A decision to defer a decision would permit fur<strong>the</strong>r erosion of U.S. opportunities<br />

and leadership and could lead to results like those cited immediately above. It<br />

would also perpetuate <strong>the</strong> current unsatisfactory situation of general uncertainty<br />

and generate fur<strong>the</strong>r dissatisfaction in Congress and among State, local, private<br />

and international users of remote sensing data from space. The consultants are<br />

convinced that <strong>the</strong> time has come to make a positive decision.<br />

5. Some concerns addressed. Two recurring concerns that have played a part in policy<br />

consideration of <strong>the</strong> U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing need to be noted and discussed<br />

briefly:<br />

[10] a. Reliance on a market test of value. In <strong>the</strong> determination of <strong>the</strong> Executive Branch<br />

policy toward U.S. involvement in civil remote sensing <strong>the</strong>re has been a tendency<br />

to judge <strong>the</strong> value of possible operational uses in terms of <strong>the</strong> willingness of <strong>the</strong><br />

user to pay for <strong>the</strong> establishment and operation of <strong>the</strong> system, and, <strong>the</strong>refore, to<br />

defer a policy commitment to continuity of data services until <strong>the</strong> users are willing<br />

and able to commit <strong>the</strong>mselves to providing <strong>the</strong> funds required.<br />

The logic and appropriateness of this approach have been criticized on many<br />

grounds. Thus, it has been pointed out that in <strong>the</strong> private sector individual customers<br />

are not expected to finance in advance <strong>the</strong> investment costs necessary to<br />

produce a product or establish <strong>the</strong> capability for providing a service. It is also<br />

pointed out that making data continuity dependent on demonstrated benefits<br />

and user commitments to operational use tends to place <strong>the</strong> program in a “Catch<br />

22” situation because of <strong>the</strong> lead times involved: <strong>the</strong> decision on data continuity<br />

has to be faced before <strong>the</strong> demonstrations needed for a commitment have been

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