Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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The new Democratic administration of President John F. Kennedy was less sympathetic than its
Republican predecessor to AT&T’s plans to establish the leading position in the development of communications
satellites. This exchange of letters reflects the position taken by new NASA Administrator
James E. Webb—that it was desirable to re-examine the government role in communications satellite
development before deciding that the government should take a secondary position in that development
to AT&T and possibly other U.S. communications carriers. The position of AT&T President Fred R.
Kappel to that stance, as reflected in his letter to Webb, is supported by a series of attachments indicating
AT&T’s plans as they had developed in the preceding months.
[1]
Document I-9
THE HONORABLE JAMES E. WEBB, Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
1520 H Street Northwest
Washington 25, D.C.
Dear Mr. Webb:
THE HISTORY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
April 5, 1961
It has come to my attention that the Wall Street Journal on March 29, 1961 carried an
article stating that invitations were issued last year to companies such as American
Telephone and Telegraph Company to come forward with partnership proposals with the
Government (on communications satellites), but that NASA has yet to receive a firm proposal
from any company.
In view of events which have taken place during the past few months, this statement,
which we understand grew out of a press conference which you held with respect to NASA’s
budget, is of deep concern to me. The specific events to which I refer are as follows.
On September 15, 1960, Mr. G. L. Best of this Company, wrote to Dr. Glennan
(Attachment No. 1) saying that we had under way the development of an active communications
satellite and associated ground radio facilities and would hope that NASA would
be willing to launch trial satellites for us at our expense if this proved to be the most practicable
arrangement.
This letter was followed by several informal discussions after which Dr. E. I. Green of
the Bell Telephone Laboratories wrote Dr. Glennan on October 20, 1960 (Attachment No.
2) and enclosed a statement of the objectives and principal features of the experiment
which the Bell System proposed to make.
[2] Subsequently, there were several discussions during which Dr. Glennan and his people
outlined some of the problems which NASA felt were involved in accepting our original
proposal. During these conversations, various possibilities of a joint NASA-Bell System
project were discussed, and on December 14, 1960 I wrote to Dr. Glennan outlining in
some detail several specific proposals as to how a joint undertaking might be accomplished
(Attachment No. 3).
Shortly after, NASA decided to ask for bids covering the construction of an active satellite
of its own design and to seek the cooperation of private industry here and of the telephone
administrations of Great Britain and France in trials using such a satellite. We were
offered an opportunity to bid on such a project and did so, making substantial allowance
in our bids for the value which we thought the telephone industry might get from such an
experiment. A copy of the transmittal letter which accompanied these bids is also enclosed
(Attachment No. 4).