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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 399<br />

are not sufficiently optimized for <strong>the</strong> market, and a large financial commitment must be<br />

made to fur<strong>the</strong>r develop and market <strong>the</strong> technology. Combined, it is not surprising that<br />

studies showed a relatively low economic return to <strong>the</strong> information publications.<br />

The second study released in 1977 was done by MathTech (a successor company to<br />

Ma<strong>the</strong>matica). This study looked at a number of successful technologies that <strong>the</strong> NASA<br />

technology transfer office had encouraged with additional R&D funds and personnel.<br />

[III-29] Technologies such as an improved firefighter’s breathing apparatus and zinc paint<br />

coatings were analyzed from an economic benefits perspective. Benefit-cost ratios were calculated<br />

and in some cases were quite high. The major problem with those results is not<br />

that <strong>the</strong>re were no significant benefits (<strong>the</strong>re were), but that <strong>the</strong> cost figures were artificially<br />

low because <strong>the</strong>y were primarily <strong>the</strong> costs of transferring <strong>the</strong> technology, not <strong>the</strong> costs<br />

involved with initially developing <strong>the</strong> technology. The selection of only a few successful<br />

cases ignores o<strong>the</strong>r transfers that were not successful and, again, tends to overstate <strong>the</strong> benefit-cost<br />

ratios. None<strong>the</strong>less, an argument can be made that without <strong>the</strong> efforts of <strong>the</strong><br />

added value contributed by <strong>the</strong> technology transfer process, ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re would have been<br />

no benefits from <strong>the</strong>se NASA innovations or <strong>the</strong> benefits would have come much later.<br />

The Chapman study of 1989 is interesting because it selected 400 technologies mentioned<br />

in Spinoff, and researchers performed interviews with <strong>the</strong> companies to attempt to<br />

measure <strong>the</strong> cumulative benefits. They found that <strong>the</strong> benefits may have been as large as<br />

$21 billion (spread over twenty years). However, <strong>the</strong> report did not attempt to calculate<br />

<strong>the</strong> costs associated with <strong>the</strong> development and transfer of those technologies, nor did it<br />

determine when or if those technologies might have been forthcoming from <strong>the</strong> firms<br />

without NASA involvement. In addition, it did not attempt to separate <strong>the</strong> NASA investment<br />

or stimulation of <strong>the</strong> products from prior and future company investments. In<br />

essence, this report is a comprehensive update of <strong>the</strong> earlier studies that documented specific<br />

cases of technologies moving from NASA to industry. [III-30]<br />

Ano<strong>the</strong>r aspect of technology transfer was <strong>the</strong> realization in <strong>the</strong> early 1970s that <strong>the</strong><br />

United States is unique among nations in <strong>the</strong> world in its openness concerning R&D<br />

results from civilian (unclassified) government-sponsored work. During <strong>the</strong> early years of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Nixon administration, an effort was made to provide U.S. government technology and<br />

information to U.S. firms first. Recognizing that under <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n-current operating practices<br />

and laws of <strong>the</strong> nation, <strong>the</strong> United States could not easily restrict information from<br />

foreign nations and firms, a program named FEDD (For Early Domestic Distribution) was<br />

initiated. NASA participated in this program and made an attempt to get information to<br />

U.S. industry before it was openly published. However, no formal evaluation was ever<br />

made of <strong>the</strong> program, and a NASA white paper in 1978 essentially concluded that it was<br />

impossible to enforce this policy. [III-31]<br />

The NASA technology transfer office also invested considerable funds in activities<br />

aimed at education and at encouraging new users for space data and products. To support<br />

<strong>the</strong>se transfer programs, <strong>the</strong> office also sponsored economic studies that focused on specific<br />

program benefits. For example, <strong>the</strong>re were a number of analyses performed in <strong>the</strong><br />

mid-1970s on <strong>the</strong> benefits that might be attributed to having improved information from<br />

<strong>the</strong> Landsat series of remote-sensing satellites. 32 Because wheat is traded on <strong>the</strong> futures<br />

market and <strong>the</strong> prices are highly volatile depending on <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong> worldwide crops,<br />

32. See, for example, ECON, Inc., Economic Benefits of Improved Information on Worldwide Crop Production,<br />

Report 76-243-1, November 15, 1976. A <strong>the</strong>oretical report on which <strong>the</strong> ECON studies were based was published<br />

by D. Bradford and H. Kelejian, The Value of Information for Crop Forecasting with Bayesian Speculators: Theory and<br />

Empirical Results, 1974, Documentary <strong>History</strong> Collection, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University,<br />

Washington, DC.

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