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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 117<br />

agreed that shares should be adjusted periodically, but left open whe<strong>the</strong>r adjustments<br />

would be based on past (U.S.) or projected use or some combination of <strong>the</strong> two. There<br />

was also a division of views on <strong>the</strong> question of circumstances under which a signatory<br />

could decline to accept an increased or decreased share.<br />

It was agreed by all but a few members that <strong>the</strong>re should be a utilization charge, partly<br />

as a means of compensating owners whose share is larger than <strong>the</strong>ir use prior to adjustment<br />

of shares. Working Group 1, which handled most of <strong>the</strong> Committee’s work,<br />

recommended <strong>the</strong> cost of money plus about 2% as <strong>the</strong> basis of compensation for use of<br />

capital in determining utilization charges.<br />

Committee III’s second Working Group considered financial provisions relating to<br />

transition from <strong>the</strong> present agreements and possible withdrawals from [16] <strong>the</strong> organization.<br />

While <strong>the</strong> Working Group did not, and did not attempt to, reach final agreement,<br />

<strong>the</strong>re was general agreement on <strong>the</strong> principles that should be applicable. It should not be<br />

too difficult to reach agreement in this area.<br />

Working Group 3 agreed, with respect to financial access to <strong>the</strong> system by non-members,<br />

that <strong>the</strong> organization, in establishing space segment utilization charges for nonmembers[,]<br />

should take account of <strong>the</strong> fact that non-members have not borne any of <strong>the</strong><br />

risks and obligations of membership. This would mean that a rate charged to non-members<br />

should take account of both <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong> members’ capital and <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>the</strong>y have<br />

taken in investing in <strong>the</strong> system.<br />

Committee IV—O<strong>the</strong>r Operational Arrangements<br />

Committee IV, which had two Working Groups, considered only procurement policy<br />

(Working Group A) and patent and data policy (Working Group B).<br />

On procurement policies <strong>the</strong>re developed three alternative approaches: (1) a relatively<br />

simple provision calling for international tenders and contractor selection on <strong>the</strong><br />

basis of <strong>the</strong> best combination of price, quality and timely delivery; (2) retention of <strong>the</strong><br />

existing interim arrangement provisions, which have allowed international spreading of<br />

contracts; and (3) <strong>the</strong> amplification of (1) above by addition of specific language encouraging<br />

international spreading of contracts with distribution roughly proportionate to relative<br />

investment percentages of members. There is, in fact, little actual difference in <strong>the</strong><br />

probable practical effect of alternatives (2) and (3). The United States, and apparently a<br />

majority of those countries expressing <strong>the</strong>mselves on this issue, favored alternative (1).<br />

The United Kingdom and Japan supported alternative (2) and France supported alternative<br />

(3). The proposed specific wording is set forth in <strong>the</strong> Committee’s report (Doc. 12).<br />

[17] With regard to patent and data policy, two alternatives emerged. The United States,<br />

<strong>the</strong> United Kingdom and o<strong>the</strong>rs favored a provision which would leave to <strong>the</strong> discretion<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Governing Body <strong>the</strong> particular patent policies to be applied in each contract negotiation.<br />

Canada, Germany, India, France and o<strong>the</strong>rs proposed a patent provision which<br />

would establish in <strong>the</strong> definitive arrangements a fixed non-exclusive license policy pursuant<br />

to which any INTELSAT contractor would get title to inventions and data developed<br />

under INTELSAT contracts, and <strong>the</strong> organization would take a non-exclusive license to<br />

use <strong>the</strong> information only in connection with space segments and would thus forego control<br />

over <strong>the</strong> contractor’s use of <strong>the</strong> information. There was virtually unanimous agreement<br />

that to <strong>the</strong> extent INTELSAT obtains rights in inventions and data, <strong>the</strong>y should be<br />

made available on a royalty-free basis for use in <strong>the</strong> INTELSAT space segment and on a<br />

reasonable royalty basis for o<strong>the</strong>r uses. The alternative patent and data policies are set<br />

forth in Com. IV/10 and 11.<br />

The Credentials Committee<br />

The Credentials Committee was nominated by <strong>the</strong> Conference Chairman and

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