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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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telegram are as follows:<br />

(A) Policy directive has not hindered desirable scientific and technological cooperation<br />

in any practical way except in <strong>the</strong> area of communications satellite<br />

technology. However, <strong>the</strong> existence of this policy has undoubtedly colored<br />

European views as to <strong>the</strong> disinterested nature of US offers of cooperation.<br />

(B) Scientific or industry dissatisfaction has not been reflected as irritant on political<br />

lines since 1964 negotiations. Political interest may reappear prior to<br />

1969 negotiations.<br />

(C) The divergencies of view among British interests on communications satellite<br />

technology were analyzed in Embassy’s A-1084 of Nov. 4. To summarize<br />

briefly, <strong>the</strong> GPO is fundamentally concerned with efficient economic communications<br />

and less involved in political and industrial considerations. The<br />

GPO strongly supports <strong>the</strong> concept of a single global system. The foreign<br />

office is anxious to abtain [sic] political cohesion in Europe and will seek<br />

European consensus even [4] at some compromise of domestic ambitions.<br />

Industry primary interest is to secure larger share of INTELSAT procurement<br />

and will support vigorously any proposal, ei<strong>the</strong>r for a single system or an independent<br />

system, which will improve its competitive position, vis-à-vis US<br />

industry. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is not taking a more active role in<br />

<strong>the</strong> communications satellite question due to participation in IDCSP and possibly<br />

ADCSP. Any MOD support for independent European initiative will<br />

depend largely on its experience with joint US/UK military projects.<br />

(D) If British are assured of US commitment to genuine cooperative effort in<br />

communications satellite technology, we believe <strong>the</strong>y would be prepared to<br />

give <strong>the</strong> required assurances. Clarification on <strong>the</strong> role of regional and national<br />

systems (e.g. ABC proposal for US national TV relay system) would be<br />

required. Also Europeans may wish to launch experimental satellites using<br />

US launchers. Embassy judgement here is not based on specific comments<br />

from industry or government but from <strong>the</strong> interpretation of expressions of<br />

opinion by <strong>the</strong> Foreign <strong>Office</strong>, GPO and industry contacts over <strong>the</strong> past year<br />

or so. Bruce<br />

BT<br />

Document I-24<br />

Document title: Memorandum from J.D. O’Connell for <strong>the</strong> President, February 8, 1967,<br />

with attached: “A Global System of Satellite Communications: The Hazards Ahead,”<br />

February 8, 1967.<br />

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (used with permission).<br />

General James D. O’Connell, <strong>the</strong> individual responsible for promoting <strong>the</strong> U.S. policy objective of creating<br />

a single global system of satellite communications based on INTELSAT, saw many hazards<br />

ahead. This memorandum sketches his perceptions of <strong>the</strong> challenges to achieving this policy objective.<br />

[1] MEMORANDUM<br />

EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 99

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