Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

“NASA Social Impact,” I have suggested some of the unique and impressive contributions
attributable to NASA. This list could serve as a tentative outline for such a study.
VI - Observation
One frequently hears and sees in print the statement, “If we can put a man on the
moon, we should be able to do so-and-so.” “So-and-so” usually is a complex social problem.
Recommendation
The proper response to this hostile or uninformed statement should be to point out
that:
a) The Apollo program had a clear and unambiguous objective, a realistic time period,
an unrestricted long-range allocation of resources, consistent support and a
continuing commitment, an available source of people, technology and building
blocks of organization, high morale and committed people, and a central authority
to run the program. It also had no opposing vested interests.
b) The typical social problem has no clear and unambiguous objectives, no longrange
allocation of resources, spotty and controversial support, inadequate numbers
of skilled people, inadequate technology and lack of applications
experience, no measures of progress, inadequate or non-existent organizations to
lean on, and generally no central authority to organize and run the program. A
powerful space technology cannot solve all these problems. It can only help when
the social problem environment is ready to accept and use the technology.
[7] VII - Observation
In social problems, there are many hazards and obstacles to the successful application
of technology.
Recommendations
EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 551
1. In selecting technology areas to work on, primary emphasis should be placed on those
that derive from space capabilities in a rather direct manner. Then we should consider
those that require talents and technology unique to NASA. Then we should consider
minor modifications and conversions of NASA technology. Following that, we
would consider major modifications of NASA technology and significant investments
in applying NASA technology to new needs. Finally, we might consider the generation
of new technology that does not exist, that no one is working on, and where we have
reason to expect a high probability of success. I use the term “technology” to include
both hardware and software as well as organizational, management, procurement,
legal, personnel, and leadership skills residing within NASA. (Specific criteria for evaluation
of proposed opportunities are discussed in Chapter XI, and some of the pitfalls
in social fields are mentioned in Chapter VII.)
2. Certain safeguards and cautions must be applied to prevent premature, inadequate or
technically unsound approaches to problems. Certain kinds of problems, particularly
where technology is not the dominant deficiency, should not be touched until the
environment is more favorable for achievement. Certain problems are and will be
intractable or unattractive for some years. These factors are discussed further in
Chapter XI of this report.
3. In general, I feel that NASA should avoid basic research, hardware development that
can be done by industry, social, psychological, behavioral or sociological studies,