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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 145<br />

<strong>the</strong> development of technology such as multi-beam spacecraft antennas, low-cost earth stations<br />

and on-board signal switching—technologies which do not readily derive from current<br />

or anticipated future activities of <strong>the</strong> private communications common carriers. In<br />

addition, because of <strong>the</strong> disaggregated nature of those who need <strong>the</strong>se services, <strong>the</strong> private<br />

sector often cannot find a ready market which justifies <strong>the</strong> risk of expansion into <strong>the</strong><br />

provision of <strong>the</strong>se new services. There is, <strong>the</strong>n, an appropriate federal role in [31] assisting<br />

<strong>the</strong> development of needed technology and in demonstrating new public services for<br />

a sufficient period that <strong>the</strong>ir users may be perceived as a viable market by <strong>the</strong> private sector.<br />

The most appropriate supplier of <strong>the</strong> needed technology is NASA.<br />

The Committee recommends that as soon as possible, NASA, with <strong>the</strong> participation of appropriate<br />

user groups, begin conceptual definition of both <strong>the</strong> needed technology (Option 4) and<br />

<strong>the</strong> public service experiments <strong>the</strong>mselves (Option 5).<br />

These initiatives are <strong>the</strong> first steps in <strong>the</strong> implementation of <strong>the</strong> Committee’s Options<br />

4 and 5 which have been described earlier in this report. The report also describes a<br />

process of checks and balances which <strong>the</strong> Committee believes are essential to channel <strong>the</strong><br />

expanded NASA role in <strong>the</strong> needed direction.<br />

Document I-29<br />

Document title: John J. Madison, Legislative Affairs Specialist, NASA, Memorandum for<br />

<strong>the</strong> Record, “Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) program meeting,<br />

October 13, 1983.”<br />

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />

Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />

Beginning in 1980, NASA reentered <strong>the</strong> communications satellite research and development area,<br />

first with a technology development effort and <strong>the</strong>n with a proposal for a satellite mission that would<br />

demonstrate various new technologies and <strong>the</strong>ir ability to work toge<strong>the</strong>r as a system. This mission,<br />

known as <strong>the</strong> Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS), was controversial within <strong>the</strong><br />

government. The Reagan administration believed that it was <strong>the</strong> private sector’s responsibility to<br />

invest in technology and demonstrate its capabilities in areas where <strong>the</strong> primary payoffs would be commercial.<br />

For several years during <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s, President Reagan refused to approve funding for<br />

NASA to develop ACTS. Hughes, <strong>the</strong> world’s leading builder of communications satellites, also<br />

opposed <strong>the</strong> program on <strong>the</strong> grounds that it represented inappropriate government competition with <strong>the</strong><br />

private sector. Congress, with a Democratic majority, believed in a partnership between <strong>the</strong> public and<br />

private sectors would assure <strong>the</strong> nation’s continued leadership in <strong>the</strong> communications satellite sector.<br />

Each year, for several years, Congress restored funding for <strong>the</strong> mission to NASA’s budget. It was not<br />

until early 1987 that <strong>the</strong> Reagan administration reversed its opposition to <strong>the</strong> program, allowing it<br />

to move forward. ACTS was finally launched in 1993. This memorandum captures <strong>the</strong> early NASA<br />

justification for <strong>the</strong> program, as presented in a meeting of two staff members of <strong>the</strong> space subcommittee<br />

of <strong>the</strong> House of Representatives (Rad Byerly and Tim Clark), head of <strong>the</strong> ACTS program at NASA<br />

Headquarters (Robert Lovell), and NASA’s legislative affairs specialist (John Madison). The program’s<br />

rationale and design underwent continual change until a program concept acceptable to both<br />

<strong>the</strong> executive branch and Congress was developed.

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