Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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SPACE AS AN INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC GROWTH
The arguments against FEDD are that it carries no sanctions, that it “flags” the most
important items so that foreign interests can focus on obtaining them, that the “troops”
at the centers do not like it, that it creates a useless work load, etc.
In a series of NASA Middle Management Seminars, FEDD was discussed in depth. The
participants recognized that “something ought to be done” to assure preferential use by
US interests of unclassified technology which might have significant early commercial
potential. When asked if they could think of something better than FEDD, the answers
were negative with a single exception. Langley has felt, given the inability to control FEDD
publications and the danger that the FEDD label might simply target them, that colloquiums
bringing together the interested US firms are to be preferred. Significant items
should be discussed in depth anyhow. This approach appears to be meritorious and has
been commended to the other field centers.
An important question raised by efforts to implement the FEDD program is this: Since
only a handful of publications has been “FEDD’ed” by NASA, are we doing the job of review
and identification very badly, is NASA admitting that only a minuscule percentage of its
technical reports possess any significant early commercial potential or is the present program
simply unworkable? It would seem essential that a thorough review of the FEDD program
as it now stands in the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology be undertaken,
along with a comparison and evaluation of any similar programs [21] in other government
agencies. Suggestions for revising the program, coordinating it with other government
programs and policies, or abolishing it could then be more rigorously evaluated.
Foreign patent program. Since the current cost of the foreign patent program greatly
exceeds the very small revenues obtained, it might be argued that the program should be
dropped. On the other hand, it would seem worthwhile to evaluate experience with the
supercritical wing patents over the next few years to better judge the future of this program.
– Marketing. As noted above, the dangers of internal enthusiasms for applications
in fields beyond the agency’s own experience and competence dictate some measure of
conservatism in pushing such applications. Therefore, “markets” must be carefully
explored in advance with the best-informed user groups; cost-benefit considerations
should be included but are especially difficult and may often have limited validity in connection
with innovations in new fields or where public interests override.
It remains true, nevertheless, that NASA’s statutory obligation to contribute to technological
advance will not implement itself. Therefore, the agency must undertake wellconsidered
programs to inform possible users, to experiment with, test, and on occasion,
demonstrate space and non-space applications in the national interest.
Because of the implications for the agency’s image, its congressional and other government
agency relationships, its industry, international and university relationships, it is
important that headquarters and center undertakings looking to new user groups and
markets be given timely visibility for management. A “flagging” system that does not inhibit
activities or establish new clearance requirements is therefore important, to permit control
by exception.
Document III-32
Document title: “NASA Technology Transfer: Report of the Technology Transfer Team,”
December 21, 1992.
Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.