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Exploring the Unknown - NASA's History Office

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EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN 41<br />

d. NASA’s approach includes competitive hardware acquisition for at least two<br />

Thor-based flights at Government expense and competitive launchings<br />

(including satellite, vehicle and launch costs) at [4] private or Government<br />

expense using at least two Atlas-based vehicles.<br />

1. The key to this approach is “competition” because it is <strong>the</strong> only way in<br />

which NASA can assure <strong>the</strong> Congress that its approach is not preferential.<br />

2. Competition may also result in a better system.<br />

5. Special Problems<br />

a. Reimbursement depends upon a ruling by <strong>the</strong> Comptroller General. If favorable,<br />

<strong>the</strong>n NASA can develop a relationship with industry which is not dependent<br />

upon <strong>the</strong> budget-authorization-appropriation cycle. If not favorable,<br />

<strong>the</strong>n NASA would have to seek legislation to authorize it to credit such reimbursements<br />

to its own appropriations.<br />

b. Patents depend upon <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> present law, unless NASA is successful<br />

in getting its statute amended. This means that AT&T’s case for waiver<br />

under <strong>the</strong> present law is one way <strong>the</strong> ownership of inventions might be<br />

determined and <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> law to a “cooperative agreement” is a<br />

less preferred way of determining ownership. NASA intends to seek a legislative<br />

amendment of its statute in <strong>the</strong> same terms as were proposed to <strong>the</strong> last<br />

Congress.<br />

c. Follow-on R&D and prototype launchings must be planned since it is hardly<br />

likely that a four-shot program will be adequate to develop an operational<br />

prototype satellite and an operational system. Back-up vehicles should be<br />

available for repetitive shots within three months of any failure.<br />

d. Participation by AT&T in all satellite communications experiments under<br />

NASA programs in a manner similar to that employed in <strong>the</strong> Echo program<br />

seems desirable from <strong>the</strong> standpoint of all concerned.<br />

[ 5] e. Publicity by AT&T should avoid “predictions” involving launchings and avoid<br />

<strong>the</strong> impression that AT&T can “go it alone” in <strong>the</strong> R&D phase. There should<br />

be closer cooperation between [public information] offices in AT&T and<br />

NASA so that AT&T releases are available to NASA in a timely manner.<br />

Document I-7<br />

Document title: White House Press Secretary, “Statement by <strong>the</strong> President,” December<br />

30, 1960.<br />

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA <strong>History</strong> <strong>Office</strong>, NASA<br />

Headquarters, Washington, D.C.<br />

Shortly before he left office, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a number of policy statements in<br />

an attempt to set <strong>the</strong> future agenda on various issues, including communications satellite policy. In<br />

a statement released to <strong>the</strong> press on December 30, 1960, Eisenhower reiterated his position that private<br />

industry should establish and operate communications satellite systems.

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