The Bhikṣuṇī Maṇimēkhalai

110 - The Philosophical Systems
Maṇimēkhalai considers the five limbs and states that the last two can
be included in the third, while the Nyāyapravēśa apparently does not
find it necessary to consider the last two at all. The current opinion is
that Dignāga was the logician who reduced the five-limbed syllogism
of Gautama and Vātsyāyana to one of three limbs only, thus giving it
the form of an Aristotelian syllogism. ‘The most important service
Dignāga did was by reducing the five members of a syllogism as
propounded by Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana to three, thereby giving it a
form more similar to the Aristotelian Syllogism of three members.’ 74
He is also believed to be the first author to have proved the invalidity
of Upamāna and Śābda as proofs, while the Maṇimēkhalai merely
states that the two may be included in the third without in any way
asserting their invalidity. This point of difference between the two
should also be noted.
A pakṣa is valid when it contains a minor term explicitly stated and a
major term also similarly stated, and a statement that the predicate
will actually differ in other application, as for example, the statement
that sound is non-eternal. In this the dharma or predicate is either
eternal or non-eternal. The hētu or liṅga or sādhana is the connecting
term, the middle term of modern logic, which appears in three forms;
either it is attributed to the subject, or it is ascribed to an example by
analogy, or it is denied to the contrary. Sapakṣa or homogeneous
statement is that which is contained in a general statement giving to
another subject a predicate [74] which is the same as that of the pakṣa
itself. If the character of being non-eternal should be ascribed to
śabda, the sapakṣa would be like the pot, etc., which are also
non-eternal. To state that which is contrary, as, whatever is not
74 Tattvasaṅgraha, vol. I. introd., pp. LXXIII-LXXIV.