The Bhikṣuṇī Maṇimēkhalai

135 - Other Views on the Philosophical Systems
regard it as a transition from the current beliefs of anterior times to
the teachings of Dignāga.
The professor follows up his criticism with further remarking,
‘Though it will probably ever be impossible to ascertain all sources
from which Śāttaṉār drew his information which lie embodied in
theoretical chapters of the Maṇimēkhalai, but still it can be done in
one case beyond the possibility of doubt. Indeed on a comparison of
the exposition of the fallacies of the Maṇimēkhalai with the
corresponding part in the Nyāyapravēśa it will be seen that the
number and order of the fallacies, and as you yourself state, “their
definitions and illustrations alike are almost identical”. Now the
material agreement of two texts amounting practically to identity
cannot be set down as a mere chance; it is impossible to expound it in
any other way than by assuming that one text is immediately or
mediately an abstract of the other; in the case under consideration, it
is evident that the author of the Maṇimēkhalai, in this part at least,
has borrowed from the Nyāyapravēśa of Śaṁkarasvāmin, [97] nor
can it be assumed that both Śāttaṉār and Śaṁkara borrowed from a
common source. For we know that Śaṁkara’s source was Dignāga’s
Nyāyadvāra of which a Chinese translation has been preserved; but he
gave a masterly exposition of his teacher’s logical system improving
however on one point by adding four more to Dignāga’s five
Pakṣa-ābhāsas. As the same four additional ābhāsas are adopted in
Śāttaṉār’s abstract, it is clear that the latter has copied from the
Nyāyapravēśa. In this regard the verdict of all unprejudiced scholars
will be unanimous. Therefore the posteriority of Śāttaṉār to
Śaṁkarasvāmin and a fortiori to Dignāga must be regarded as
established. The upper limit of the position of the Maṇimēkhalai may
be taken to be A.D. 500.’