The Bhikṣuṇī Maṇimēkhalai

112 - The Philosophical Systems
there is similarity of character, there is also a similarity of attribute,
e.g. non-eternal like a pot where the example is similar to the pot. An
example is heterogeneous as where the predicate does not exist, the
reason also does not exist. [75] Similarly the three, Pakṣa, Hētu and
ṣṭānta could be fallacious. These are respectively called Pakkappōn,
that which looks like a pakṣa; Hētuppōli, that which looks like hētu;
and ṣṭāntappōli that which looks like ṣṭānta.
Of these Pakkappōli (fallacious thesis) is of nine kinds: (1) a thesis
incompatible with Pratyakṣa or direct perception; (2) a thesis (pakṣa)
incompatible with inference (Anumāna); (3) a thesis incompatible
with one’s own statement (Suvacana-viruddham in the text, obviously
for Svāvacana); (4) a thesis incompatible with what is generally
accepted as true (Lōka-viruddham) (5) a thesis incompatible with
accepted tradition, (Āgama-viruddham); (6) a thesis with an
unfamiliar attribute or predicate or a major term
(Aprasiddha-viśēṣaṇa); (7) a thesis with an unfamiliar minor term
(Aprasiddha-viśēṣyam); (8) a thesis with an unfamiliar major and
minor term (Aprasiddha-ubhayam); (9) and a thesis already accepted
by one but unacceptable to the opponent (Aprasiddha sambhandham).
Of these the first is incompatible with what is directly perceived as
when it is said that sound is not audible to the ear.
Anumāna-viruddham is contradictory to inference as in saying that a
pot is eternal when it is known to be non-eternal being a product. The
third thesis is contradicting one’s own statement as when one asserts
the barrenness of his own mother. The fourth Lōka-viruddham is
incompatibility with what is recognized by all, as when seeing the
moon one says that it is not the moon, (5) Āgama-viruddham is when it
goes against the accepted authoritative book of one’s own faith, as