The Bhikṣuṇī Maṇimēkhalai

30 - Supplement
chief points of my [xxxii] earlier deduction – the acquaintance of the
author of Maṇimēkhalai with Dignāga’s philosophy.
First of all I can assert with satisfaction that I have correctly
interpreted the confusing and distorted passages dealing with
perception and the condition for the conclusiveness of an argument,
and have referred to the respective theories of Dignāga. The
definition of Pratyakṣa reads in the new translation; name (nāma),
class (jāti), quality (guṇa), and action (kriyā) are excluded from this,
viz. perception, as they are obtainable from inference (Anumāna).
That corresponds as I have indicated above to Dignāga’s doctrine. The
passage on the three conditions of conclusive reason reads (in chapter
29) ‘the reason (hētu) is of three kinds:– (1) ‘being attributive of the
subject; (2) becoming attributable to a similar subject, and (3)
becoming not attributable to the opposite, – Thereupon follows the
definition of Sapakṣa and Vipakṣa (similar subject and the opposite).
This passage of the trairūpya of the liṅga forms the basis of Dignāga’s
system of logic, whereby the logic of the Nyāya system shows itself
far superior and as is well known has acquired considerable influence
over the further development of Indian logic. There is thus no doubt
that the author of Maṇimēkhalai knew of Dignāga’s doctrine of
cognizance and logic. But we can now go an important step further
beyond the earlier established facts. For in those portions of the 29 th
chapter of the Maṇimēkhalai which Kanakasabhai has not translated,
the Buddhistic system of logic is expounded, and is quite in strict
agreement with the contents of the Nyāyapravēśa as it is known to us
through an analysis of the Chinese translation of that work by