Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. iv. of Original Sin. 103
as an introduction some account of the state from which
this was a fall, i.e. of man s original righteousness.
The original righteousness of man, then, is universally
described in ancient writers as partly natural, partly super
natural. It was natural in this respect, that it proceeded
from the exercise of a natural freewill and power of choice.
It was supernatural in this respect, that certain supernatural
gifts, in addition to freewill, were required for it. These
gifts could not produce righteousness unless his natural will
first consented to use them ; nor could his will, however
sound, without the inspiring assistance of these gifts ; and
grace was necessary for the righteousness of man upright
as well as of man fallen.
Such a doctrine, however, requires some explanation
with respect to two points. P"irst, how could it be main
tained with a consistent meaning that supernatural assist
ance was necessary towards fulfilling the Divine precepts,
if man had naturally freewill ? For we mean by freewill,
it may be said, the power, supposing the opportunity, of
doing or abstaining from any actions whatever ; and there
fore, whatever impulse and facility might be given to right
action by supernatural assistance, the poiver to act would
not depend upon it. But to this objection it may be replied
that, however we may define freewill in words as such a
power, we do not mean that it is such a power abstracted
from all stimulus or motive supplied to our nature from
other quarters. Thus, in the sphere of common life, a man
with freewill has the power to do his duty to his parents,
relations, and friends ; but he has not this power indepen
dently of certain affections implanted in his nature over
and above his will. Such questions as these cannot be
treated satisfactorily, on account of the great defects and
obscurity both in our conceptions of our own nature and
the language in which we express them. But, upon the most
correct idea we can form of what the will is, and what the
affections are, it would seem that neither of them could,
without the other, enable us to fulfil our duties in common
life. The benevolent affections incline us indeed to bene
volent acts ; but, unless supported by the will, they yield