Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. vin. of Freewill. 209
wrangiings and disputes of philosophers, we, as we acknow
ledge one supreme and true God, so acknowledge His
supreme will, power, and foreknowledge. Nor do we fear
on that account that we do not do with our will what we
do with our will nee timemus ne ideo non voluntate
faciamus, quod voluntate facimus We say both
that God knows all things before they take place, and that
we act with our will, inasmuch as we feel and know we do
not act except with our will. [
This, however, being S. s Augustine definition of free
will, it must be admitted that a considerable body of lan
guage, especially his language at the commencement of
the book De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, and in the two
Epistles 2
relating to the occasion on which that book was
written, appears at first sight to advance upon this defini
tion, and to imply an original and self-determining power
in the will. He argues for freewill as a doctrine of Scrip
ture, and uses the common arguments which the maintainers
of the ordinary doctrine of freewill use ; viz. that Scripture
employs commands, promises, and threats, and speaks to
men as if they had freewill. Such an argument proves that
he i.e. Scripture as interpreted by him acknowledges a
will in man which is truly and properly the subject of com
mands, promises, and threats and can ;
such a will, it may
be asked, be anything but a self-determining one ? Does
not such a mode of addressing man suppose an original
power of choice in him ? But though this would be sound
and correct as a popular inference from such language, it
is not as a logical one. Logically all that can be inferred
from the use of commands and threats in the Divine deal
ings with man is, that man has a capacity for choosing,
obeying, and acting upon motives 3 ; but these are opera-
1 De Civ. Dei, 1. 5. c. 9. ... Non sic autem Deus. Semper
2
Ep. 214, 215. seque determinate vult. Per meri-
8 Non eodem modo se habent turn innotescit hominibus, dsemoni-
Deus et homo ad reddendum praemium.
Homo namque
bus, et forsitan Angelis, quale prae-
sicut Rex mium publico
quis habebit. . . . Cum dici-
edicto promulgat, monetque
ipse
tur, Deus vult istum propter merita
indifferens et indeterminatus in praemiare, hoc est, Deus vult istum
voluntate sua circa sibi subjectos. praemiare propter merita finaliter