Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. xi. Conclusion. 30^
\j j
knowledge indefinitely, and given it a right to decide upon
the possibilities of things, and to judge the scheme of Pro
vidence. To draw the mean between these two extremes
is the work of an acute and original judgment, and requires
a peculiar constitution of mind. The tendency of even
deep and able minds generally is so immediately to fasten
on any assumption, especially any one relating to divine
things, which appears at first sight a natural one to them,
that their very power becomes a snare, and before they have
reflected upon an idea they are committed to it ; so that
to return to the preliminary question of its truth would be
in the highest degree difficult to them, as being so offen
sive to an already formed bias. Indeed, some minds of
great pretensions appear to labour under a moral inability
in this respect ; their intellect, strong in pursuing an idea,
is so utterly unable to stop itself for the purpose of judg
ment, that in reference to that particular function it may
be said to have almost the imperfection of a mere instinct,
rather than to operate as the true faculty of reason. This
mixture of singular weakness with singular power it is
which makes the task of estimating authorities so difficult;
opinions of the greatest value on details and collateral
points being sometimes of the very least on fundamental
questions,
or those concerned with the soundness or unsoundness
of original assumptions. Yet assumptions and
particular dicta, laid down in the first instance by minds
of this latter class, have had great weight and a long reign
in the world ; one writer taking them up after another ;
till some person of original powers of judgment has risen
up who, on comparing an assertion carefully with his own
knowledge, has discovered a want of connection between
the two. He has not seen such truth included within that
field of apprehended truth, set out and divided from that
of conjecture, in his mind ; and this negative discovery once
made, has, like other discoveries, approved itself to the
world, people seeing it when it was pointed out to them.
Such a judgment passed upon any important set of assump
tions is a discovery in philosophy; and in this respect
modern philosophy has improved much upon the ancient.