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Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

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324<br />

Note IV.<br />

NOTE IV. p. 21.<br />

LOCKE S <strong>the</strong>ory that facts, <strong>of</strong> sense or reflexi<strong>on</strong>, are <strong>the</strong><br />

sole source <strong>of</strong> our ideas, places him in a difficulty with<br />

respect to this indistinct class <strong>of</strong> ideas. He is committed<br />

to <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong> deriving <strong>the</strong>m from this source, and<br />

tries in a roundabout way to extract <strong>the</strong>m from it. They<br />

are ultimately grounded <strong>on</strong> and derived from ideas which<br />

come in by sensati<strong>on</strong> or reflexi<strong>on</strong>, and so may be said to<br />

come in by sensati<strong>on</strong> or reflexi<strong>on</strong>. First Letter to Bishop<br />

<strong>of</strong> Worcester. But though he is in a difficulty as to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

origin, and cannot combine <strong>the</strong>m with his <strong>the</strong>ory, he<br />

as a fact this class <strong>of</strong> indistinct ideas. Thus<br />

acknowledges<br />

<strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> substance is <strong>the</strong> obscure and indistinct vague<br />

idea <strong>of</strong> something which has <strong>the</strong> relati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> support or<br />

substratum to modes or accidents. Ibid. The idea<br />

<strong>of</strong> substance is but a supposed I know not what to sup<br />

port those ideas we call accidents. We talk like chil<br />

dren who, being questi<strong>on</strong>ed what such a thing is which<br />

<strong>the</strong>y know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that<br />

it is something. Essay, b. ii. c. 23. The being <strong>of</strong><br />

substance would not be at all shaken by my saying we had<br />

but an obscure imperfect idea <strong>of</strong> it ; or indeed if I should<br />

say we had no idea <strong>of</strong> substance at all. For a things may be, and are granted to have<br />

in nature, <strong>of</strong> which we have no ideas.<br />

great many<br />

being, and to be<br />

For example, it<br />

cannot be doubted but <strong>the</strong>re are distinct species <strong>of</strong><br />

separate spirits <strong>of</strong> which yet we have no distinct ideas at<br />

all. And as he acknowledges an idea <strong>of</strong> substance which<br />

is yet no true or adequate idea, so he does <strong>of</strong> infinity.<br />

The additi<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> finite things suggests <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> infinite<br />

<strong>the</strong> same. But in<br />

by a power we find <strong>of</strong> still increasing<br />

endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging,<br />

always advancing, <strong>the</strong> idea is still imperfect and incom<br />

plete.<br />

b. ii. c. 17.<br />

Essay)<br />

Though Stillingfleet <strong>the</strong>n presses him hard up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

origin <strong>of</strong> such ideas, it is evident that with respect to <strong>the</strong><br />

nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ideas <strong>the</strong>mselves Locke has greatly <strong>the</strong>

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