Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. Till. of Freewill. 205
The writer, indeed, appears to think that the admission
of the fact of the will, or voluntary action, is itself a
and that necessitarians
safeguard against necessitarianism ;
have to be driven by argument into the acknowledgment
of this fact the admission of ; which, when they are forced
to see and confess it, makes them virtually cease to be such.
But all necessitarians acknowledge in limine, and without
any difficulty, the fact of the will ; indeed, every
sound mind must.
one of
I will not, however, understand Archbishop Whately in
the necessi
this passage as more than neutral ; tolerating
tarian, and treating the question between him and his
opponent, provided the fact of the will is admitted, as one
of no importance. But perhaps even this assertion should
be modified. It is true, indeed, that, so long as men ac
knowledge a will, responsibility, and moral obligations, there
is nothing in necessitarianism to interfere with practical
religion. But still the theory has important consequences
in theology, and largely affects our idea of the Divine
dealings, which it represents under an aspect repulsive to
our natural feeling and sense of justice. And though a
mystery must be acknowledged on this subject, it is a
different thing to hold the predestinarian doctrine, as the
when persons talk of the stronger comes the more strongly felt momotive
prevailing, they sometimes tive ; and the man acts on the right
make the assertion in a sense in- side. In this sense, then, there is
volving an original act of the will no doctrine of itself. A man is drawn by some
.strong temptation
necessity involved in
the position that a man must act
towards a bad upon the strongest motive. For in
act, while conscience dissuades : the every act of choice between good
bad motive is at the first much the and evil, the will either does or does
stronger of the two ; he feels the not create this good stronger moformer
as almost overwhelming, tive ; in either case it is the man s
while the latter is but feebly felt; will acting well or ill, and not the
but his will now comes in and de- power of externally caused motives,
liberately increases and strengthens which produces the result. But
the conscientious motive, calling up understanding by the term motive
every consideration of present or something simply acting from withfuture
interest to outweigh the other, out upon the mind, to say that the
and putting the advantages of the stronger motive must prevail, is to
right side as vividly before the say that the individual s act is demind
as possible. Thus in time cided by causes outside of himself,
what was the more feebly felt be- :
.