Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. VIII. of Freewill. 22,
which is the reason we cannot deny that the perfection of
that righteousness is possible even in this life ; because all
things are possible to God, both what He does when His
own will
solely operates, and what He does when the wills
of His creatures operate with Him sive qucc facit sola
sua voluntate, swe, quce co-operantibus creaturce succ
voluntatibus, a se fieri posse constitute? * Here is a co
operation mentioned of the human will with the Divine,
but it is a co-operation subordinated to an absolute power
in the Divine will. Whatever therefore such co-operation
in the human will involves, it does not involve any de
pendence of the issue upon it, inasmuch as such issue is
secured by the absolute power of the Divine will to pro
duce it. The power is on one side, the co-operation on
another; co-operation abstracted from power is instru
mental co-operation.
The same mode of co-operation is described in the
following extract : When God wills the salvation of a
man, no will of man resists Him. For to will or not to
will is in the power of the willing or unwilling man in such
sense only that it does not impede the Divine will or frus
trate the Divine power sic enim velle seu nolle in volentis
aut nolentis est potestate., ui Divinam voluntatem non
impediat, nee super et potestatem. 2 Here it is said that
in a particular sense a man s will is in his own power, and
were the sense in which this were allowed a free and
natural one, nothing more would be wanted for a testimony
on the side of freewill. But we see at once that it is any
thing but a free and natural sense in which this power is
conceded ; for it is conceded under the salvo, that this
power does not interfere with the natural operation of
another power, which other power is absolute. But what
is power which is itself the subject of absolute power?
Had S. Augustine wished to admit a real power in the
human will, there are many plain and simple modes in
which he might have done it, as a common language in
theology, both ancient and modern, on this subject shows.
But he only admits a power which is negatived by an entire
1 De Lit. et Spirit, c. 5
2 De Corr. et Grat. c. xiv.