Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 55
essential power of the human will. 1 However rare, there
fore, its attainment might be, perfection, upon his system,
was attainable by everyone : indeed some he asserted had
actually attained it : an assertion from which S. Augustine
shrank. The possibility admitted in theory, his practical
belief withdrew the admission, and bound man, as long as
he remains in this mortal state to sin, obliged to cry with
the Apostle who shall deliver me from this death ? and by
the simple profession of 4
having no sin infallibly con
victed of falsehood and pride.
The original position respecting the will thus led im
mediately to the other great question
selves thrown at once on the great subject of the Pelagian
controversy. Such a doctrine of the power of the human
: and we find our
will was evidently opposed to the doctrine of the fall :
for such a will was evidently not a corrupt, but a sound
will, inasmuch as it could perform its proper function. It
may be doubtful, therefore, whether Pelagius in the first
instance meant to attack the catholic doctrine of the fall ;
he certainly showed reluctance to come into express col
lision with it, and resisted the logical strain upon him :
his attitude was at the first a defensive rather than aggres
sive one, as if, provided the church would let him hold
what he considered to be the plain facts of human nature,
he did not wish to interfere with any received doctrine :
and his answers at the Synod of Diospolis 2 are perhaps too
1 Ante omnia interrogandus est ergo cum peecato esse; et jam pec-
si illud debere con-
qui negat hominem sine peecato esse catum non erit,
posse, quid sit quodcunque peccatum, stiterit. Aut si hoc etiam dici abquod
vitari potest, an quod vitari non surdum est, confiteri necesse est
potest. Si qxiod vitari non potest, debere hominem sine peecato esse,
peccatum non est ; si quod vitari po- et constat eum non aliud debere
test, potest homo sine peecato esse . . . quam potest. Iterum qusequod
vitari . . . potest. Iterum rendum est quomodo non potest homo
quserendum est peccatum voluntatis sine peecato esse, voluntate an naan
necessitatis est. Si necessitatis tura. Si natura, peccatum non est ;
est, peccatum non est; si voluntatis si voluntate, perfacile potest voluntas
est, vitari potest. . . . Iterum voluntate mutari. Pelagius ap.
quserendum est, utrumne debeat Aug. De Perfectione Justitise, c. 2.
homo sine peecato esse. Proeul du- 3. 6.
bio debet. Si debet, potest ; si non 2 Benedictine Editor s preface to
potest, ergo nee debet ; et si nee Augustine s Antipelagian <strong>Treatise</strong>s,
debet homo esse sine peecato, debet c. x.