Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 57
into captivity to the law of sin. ! The sense of freedom is
a true part of human nature but there is ; also, on the
other side, a sense of : captivity and as Pelagius appealed
to one side of our consciousness, Augustine appealed to the
other.
The conscience of every enlightened man, as all con
fess, bears witness to the presence of sin. But more than
this the enlightened conscience bears witness to a certain
impossibility of avoiding sin altogether. It is true we are
conscious of freewill, and feel we have the power of doing
right and abstaining from wrong on each occasion. Nay,
the very sense of sin depends upon this sense of the power
to avoid it; for we do not feel responsible for what we
cannot help. But with this sense of freedom there is also
a certain sense of necessity a perception that sin is not
wholly avoidable in this present state of our nature. We
cannot imagine an enlightened conscience in which there
would not be this inward sense : no good man could ever
1 In mediiim procedit homo ille
"
qui clamat, Non quod volo facio
bonum, sed quod nolo malum hoc
ago."
1. Op. Imp. 6. c. 18. Qui
per legem quam vidit in membris
suis repugnautem legi mentis suse
et captivantem se sub lege peccati,
"
clamat, Non quod volo," &c. Si
habet liberum arbitrium, quare non
facit bonum quod vult? L. 3. c.
112. Augustine, assuming this
captivity as an evident fact, proves
original sin from it: Nam si peccatum
non pertransisset, non omnis
homo cum lege peccati quse in mem
bris est nasceretur. L. 2.
1 Homo qui non cogitas ubi
c. 63.
sis, et
in diebus malis tanquam in bonis
ceecus extolleris ; quando erat libe
rum arbitrium, nondum homo vani-
tati similis factus erat. L. 3. c.
110. Quidicit, "Quod nolo malum,
hoc ago," responde utrum necessitatem
non habeat. L. 5.c. 50. Non
ei possibilitatis inanitas, sed neces-
sitatis inerat plenitudo.
L. 5. c. 59.
The Pelagians interpreted this
text as referring to the force of cus
tom, Ille enim in membris legem
consuetudinem malam vocabat, quae
ab eruditis etiam seculi dici solet
secunda natura. Op. Imp.
1. I.e.
69. An interpretation which Augus
tine turned against them, as com
them to the admission that
mitting
sin might be necessary, and yet real
sin, and so to the principle of origi
nal sin. Nam et ille qui dicit,
" Non quod volo, ago," certe secundum
vos necessitate consuetudinis
premitur : hanc autem necessitatem,
ne liberum auferatis arbitrium, eum
sibi voluntate fecisse contenditis, et
tale aliquid in natura humana factum
esse non creditis. L. 4. c. 103. ;
also 1. 1. c. 105.; 1.4. c. 91. The
body of this death was interpreted
of the guilt of past sin. Quis me
liberavit a reatu peccatorum meorum
quse commisi, cum vitari potuisseut.
Op. Imp. 1. 1, c. 67.