Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. viir. of Freewill. 227
action is free. We act willingly and without compulsion
whenever we truly act at all ; for action forced upon us is
not our own, but another s, and to act willingly is to act
freely. We act with deliberation, choice, preference, on
certain principles, and to certain ends. But it does not
follow, it is argued, that our mode of action decides any
thing as to the source of action : we act as we will ; but
the question still remains how we come to will. Under
neath all our sensations of original agency, it is maintained,
a deeper cause operates, and that which is not the will pro
duces the movements and acts of the will. Men are
acted upon, that they may act, not that they may not act
aguntur ut agant non ut ipsi nikil agant.
A transla
tion cannot give the point of the original, which is literally
that men are acted that they may act ; the passive and
the active of the same verb being used to express the more
pointedly the entire sequency
of an effect from a cause.
Men act agunt, that is the effect ; they are acted upon
aguntur, that is the cause which accounts for the whole
of the effect. The whole cause then, of human acts is
is not never
beyond the agent himself. But the agent
theless inert, because he is not a cause ; on the contrary,
he is an agent, he acts. He is not caused to do nothing ;
caused to be idle, passive, motionless; an actor is the very
thing he is caused to be. That is to say, his mode of act
coexists with a source of action
ing, which is wholly free,
which is external. When we will we will, but He makes
us to will cerium est nos velle cum volumus, sed ille
facit ut velimus bonum. An objector is supposed to say
that he must be the cause of his own acts because he wills
them. But he is told that his mode of action, which is
free, decides nothing as to its source. That a man should
be forced to will cogatur velle, would be a contradiction;
for,
if he is forced he does not will, he cannot will unwill
ingly cum enim cogitur non vult, et quid absurdius
quam ut dicatur nolens velle. 1 But there is no contra
diction in his being made to will, because the will cannot
resist before it exists, and therefore cannot be opposed to
1
Op. Imp.
Q 2
1. 1. c. 134.