Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CFAP. ii. Argument for Predestination. 31
sistible. But to what kind of truth does the doctrine of
the fall belong ? Tt is evident on the mere statement of
it, that it is not a truth which we hold in the same manner
in which we do the ordinary truths of reason and experience.
Because it is met immediately by a counter truth. Man
kind has a sense of moral power, of being able to do good
actions and avoid wrong ones, which, so far as it goes,
contradicts the doctrine of the fall. For so far as it is true
that we can do what we ought to do, our nature is not
fallen it is ; equal to the task imposed upon it and it is
;
our own personal fault, and not our nature s, if it is not
done. The conclusion, then, of the necessity of an irre
sistible grace to produce a good life, has in the doctrine of
the fall not a complete, but an imperfect premiss, and
must follow the conditions of that premiss. The doctrine
of the fall is held under a reserve on the side of the con
trary truth ; the doctrine of irresistible grace, then, must
be held under the same reserve. So far as man is fallen,
but so far as he is not fallen, he does
he wants this grace ;
not want it. One inference, then, from one part of the
whole premiss lies under the liability to be contradicted by
another from another part and the ; legitimate issue is no
whole or perfect conclusion, but only a conditional and
imperfect one.
The predestinarian, however, neglects this distinction,
and upon an imperfect basis raises a definite and complete
doctrine. Or, which is the same thing, he does not see
that the basis is imperfect. He does not consent to hold
ing the doctrine of the fall with this reserve, but imagines
and he proceeds to
he has in this doctrine a complete truth ;
use it as he would any ordinary premiss of reason or experi
ence, and founds a perfect argumentative structure upon it.
Thus much for the structure of the doctrine of predes
tination, as raised on the basis of original sin. And the
same answer may be made to the defence of the justice of
the doctrine on the same ground ; to the argument that,
inasmuch as all mankind deserve eternal punishment ante
cedently to actual sin, it cannot be unjust to consign a
portion of them antecedently to it.