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Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

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<strong>Augustinian</strong> <strong>Doctrine</strong><br />

CHAP. vm.<br />

ti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> will, and are wholly performed, if <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

a will to perform <strong>the</strong>m, without going into <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong><br />

what decides that will. If man has a will, which will is<br />

intended to act in <strong>the</strong> particular way <strong>of</strong> choice and obe<br />

dience, he must be addressed in a manner suitable to such<br />

a design ; he must be commanded, in order that he may<br />

obey, and he must have <strong>the</strong> alternative placed before him<br />

in order that He choose. But such a mode <strong>of</strong> addressing<br />

him does not necessarily prove any more than that he is<br />

possessed <strong>of</strong> a will to which those operati<strong>on</strong>s bel<strong>on</strong>g. While,<br />

<strong>the</strong>refore, in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> Scripture we are justified in taking<br />

such language to imply an original and self-determining<br />

will in man, because Scripture is addressed to <strong>the</strong> popular<br />

understanding, and this is <strong>the</strong> popular inference to draw<br />

from such language ; in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> a philosophical writer<br />

like Augustine, who treats <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human will and <strong>the</strong><br />

questi<strong>on</strong>s bel<strong>on</strong>ging to it in a scientific and subtle way,<br />

and from whose language <strong>the</strong>refore we are not justified<br />

in inferring more than it logically c<strong>on</strong>tains, we cannot<br />

take it as implying more than <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> a will in<br />

a man.<br />

Indeed, <strong>the</strong> fact <strong>of</strong> a will is all <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> which he<br />

himself arrives at by this argument, and all thai^ he presses<br />

up<strong>on</strong> his readers. 1 These commands would not be given<br />

unless man had a will truly bel<strong>on</strong>ging to him with which<br />

to obey <strong>the</strong>m nisi homo haberet propriam voluntatem,<br />

qua divinis prceceptis obediret. To <strong>the</strong> man who says I<br />

cannot do what is commanded, because he is c<strong>on</strong>quered by<br />

c<strong>on</strong>cupiscence, <strong>the</strong> &quot;<br />

Apostle says, Will not to be overcome<br />

&quot;<br />

<strong>of</strong> evil, but overcome evil with good ; will not to be<br />

overcome noli vinci implying certainly a choice <strong>of</strong> his<br />

will ; for to will and not to will is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual s will<br />

arbitrium voluntatis ejus sine dubio c<strong>on</strong>venitur, velle<br />

enim et nolle proprice voluntatis est. Freewill is suffi-<br />

ordinanda, i.e. vult quod tails sit denda. . . . Deusprimovulthomini<br />

finis talium meritorum secundum prsemium et gloriam tanquam finem,<br />

ordinem ab ipso talibus prsesti- et ideo vult sibi et facit merita<br />

tutum, ita quod merita nullo modo c<strong>on</strong>grua. Bradwardine, p.<br />

antecedenter, causaliter, a priori, seq.<br />

m<strong>on</strong>ent, determinant, vel actuant<br />

Yoluntatem divinam ad prsemia red- seq.<br />

150. et<br />

! De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. ii. et

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