Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

266 Scholastic Doctrine CHAP. X.
this, or charge (rod with them which latter no Christian
can do. The most rigid predestinarian writers impose this
responsibility upon
man. 1
1
Archbp. Laurence s use of the
following statement iu Aquinas (B.
L. p. 151.) shows the same want of
insight into his system, and the
same contented resting on the ap
parent meaning of particular langu
age, without any consciousness of a
different interpretation, which in a
vast and intricate theological fabric
might be reflected from other quar
ters it. upon Dicendum quod electio
divina non praeexigit diversitatem
gratiae, quia haec electionem consequitur
; sed praeexigit diversitatem
naturae in divina cognitioue, et facit
diversitatem gratiae, sicut dispositio
diversitatem naturae facit. In
Lomb. 1. 1. Dist.-il. Q. 1. A. 2. He in
fers from this that election is asserted
by Aquinas to be on the ground of
foreseen merits in the individual, a
diversitas natures in the good man
from that of the bad man. But this
very statement says that this diver
sitas natures is the effect of a divine
arrangement or disposing dispositio
diversitatem natures facit. And
when we turn to the part of Aquinas
system which relates to grace, we
find that a certain Divine prepara
tion of the man, while in a state of
nature and previous to a state of
grace, is necessary as a preparation
for grace pr&paratio voluntatis
humance ad consequendum ipsum
gratiee habitualis donum auxilium
yratuitum Dei interius animam movent
is. l raa 2 llac
Q. 109. A. 6. Gratiae
causa non potest esse actus humanus
per modum meriti, sed dispositio naturalis
quaedam in quantum per actus
praeparamur ad gratiae susceptionem.
Aquinas, vol. viii. De Praed. This
is, then, the dispositio natures here
referred to, which is a Divine mould
ing of the natural man to fit him
for grace. The statement, again,
on which Archbp. Laurence relies
Dicendum quod quamvis Deus, quan
tum in se est, sequaliter se habeat
ad omnes, non tamen aequaliter se
habeant omnes ad ipsum, et ideo
non aequaliter omnibus gratia praeparatur
(in Lomb. 1. i. Dist. 40. Q.
2. A. 2.) cannot be reposed in
against a whole interpretative force
of the system explaining it the other
way. In the first stage of original
sin all men do eequaliter se habvnt
ad Deum : but God lifts some out of
this state, and others not, previously,
as we have just seen, to conferring
actual grace upon them. In this
intermediate stage, then, all men do
not eequetliter
se habent ad Deum, but
some are and some are not in a
preparatory state for : grace but
this difference is the result of the
Divine will.
Archbp. Laurence relies on Cal
vin s dissatisfaction with Aquinas,
but the instance to which he refers
is no case of substantial disagree
ment between the two, but only of a
difference between a more subtle and
a broader mode of statement. Cal
vin censures the refinement or quib
ble argutia, of Aquinas in saying
that foreseen human merit, though
not the cause of predestination on
God s part, may be called the cause
of it in a certain way quodammodo
on man s part because ;
God, hav
ing predestinated men to goodness,
predestinates them to glory because
they are good. Such a statement
makes no difference in the doctrine
of predestination as a whole ; be
cause though one part of it is re
garded as dependent on another,
the whole is made to depend on the
Divine will solely. But Calvin
dislikes the subtlety as interfering
with the breadth of the doctrine: