Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. in. The Pelagian Controversy. 5 1
independent of grace, claiming some real power for un
assisted nature, though not all, he was led into a double
and inconsistent language, which sometimes asserted the
necessity of grace, and sometimes the alone.
ability of nature
Indeed, it is clear from the argument of the book De
Gratia Christi, that, whatever objection Augustine may
raise to the Pelagian doctrine of grace, on the ground that
grace in it only means Lex et Natura, his main objection
to that doctrine is, not that it maintains an external grace
as distinguished from an internal, or a grace creative as
distinguished from additional to created nature, but that
it maintains a grace which depends entirely on an in
dependent act of the will for its acceptance and use, as dis
tinguished from a grace which supplies that act and secures
its own use. Pelagius defines what the function of grace
in his idea is, and he confines it to that of assisting the power
of the natural will possibilitatem adjuvat 1
; the phrase
supposes a foundation of independent power in the will, to
which is grace an addition. Augustine, on the other hand,
says it is more than this, and condemns this definition as
insufficient and insulting to the Divine Power. This is
the question, then, to which the whole argument is sub
stantially reduced, and on which the whole book hinges ;
and it is one concerned, not with the circumstances, so to
speak, of grace, as the other distinctions were, but with
its substantial nature, its relation to the human will ;
1 Nos sic tria ista distinguimus, ipsam possibilitatem gratise suseadet
certum velut in ordinem digesta juvat semper auxilio. Pelagius de
partimur. Primo loco posse strttui- Lib. Arb. apud Aug. de Grat. Christi,
mus, secundo velle, tertio esse. n. 5.
Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio,
esse in effectu locamus. Primum
illud, id est, posse, ad Deum pro-
Thus Julian : Adsunt tamen ad-
jutoria gratiae Dei quse in parte
virtutis nunquam destituunt volun-
prie pertinet, qui illud creaturse suse tatem: cujus licet innumerge species,
contulit : duo vero reliqua, hoc est, tali tamen semper moderatione advelle
et esse ad hominem referenda hibentur, ut nunquam liberum arbisunt,
quia de arbitrii fonte descen- trium locopellant, sed prsebeant addunt.
Ergo in voluntate et in opere minicula,quamdiueisvoluerit inniti ;
bono laus hominis est ; imo et homi- cum tamen non opprimant reluctan-
nis et Dei, qui ipsius voluntatis et tern animum. Op. Imp. 1. iii. c.
operis possibilitatem dedit, quique 114.
B 2