Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

248 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
pressed one, was not opposed to any, but harmonised with
all facts ; and evil was no rebel against it, but its subject ;
nothing impeded, then, but everything in heaven and earth
fulfilled this eternal, incomprehensible Will, which was of
the essence of God, and which was God.
Now, this distinction is drawn with greater breadth,
boldness, and strength than the preceding ones ; but it is
open to the same answer, viz. that so far as it denies the
disagreement of the Divine Will with evil it is false, so
far as it admits it it is useless for its purpose. This posi
tion of a real will of God which is different from His
expressed will may be interpreted in two ways. It may
be understood as meaning that the real will of God is in
true and actual harmony with evil, the expressed being
only an outside show, which is useful in some way for the
Divine government of mankind in this present state, and
the maintenance of this existing system. And a theory
like this has been put forward in modern times, represent
ing the Divine Will, as expressed in the distinction of good
and evil, as a mere mask, concealing a deeper truth behind
a truth of pure fact, in which good and evil meet and
it ;
are united, and each is good. The commands and prohibi
tions, the promises and the terrors of the moral law, are
according to such a theory but a display, which deludes
the mass, but is penetrated by the philosopher. And
understood in such a way this position does indeed get rid
most effectually of the difficulty of the existence of evil
as being against the will of God, and so a sign against
His Power. But then, understood in such a way, this
position is false and impious. We cannot suppose any
difference between the real and the expressed will of God, 1
without destroying the basis of all morals and religion.
1 Et si ilia dicantur Dei voluntas, fieret, sed ut Abrahse probaretur
ideo quia signa sunt Divinse volun- fides ; et in evangelic prsecepit satatis,
non est tamen intelligendum nato ne cui diceret ; ille autem
Deum omne illud fieri velle quod prsedicavit ubique, intelligens Deum
cuicunque prsecipit, vel non fieri non ideo prohibuisse, quin vellet
quod prohibuit. Prsecepit enim opus suum prsedicari, sed ut daret
Abrahse immolare filium, nee tamen formam homini, laudem humanam
voluit; nee ideo
prsecepit ut id declinandi. Lomb. 1. 1. Dist. 45.