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Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

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244. Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.<br />

harm<strong>on</strong>y <strong>of</strong> cause with cause, we have, in <strong>the</strong> place <strong>of</strong> two<br />

truths, <strong>on</strong>e truth, and <strong>the</strong> Divine Power is maintained, but<br />

freewill is aband<strong>on</strong>ed.<br />

Such a compact and harm<strong>on</strong>ious <strong>the</strong>ory, however, en<br />

countered in limine <strong>on</strong>e great difficulty. Up<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> idea<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Divine Power, thus singly and determinately carried<br />

out, and made <strong>the</strong> exclusive rati<strong>on</strong>ale <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> facts in<br />

<strong>the</strong> universe, how were we to account for <strong>the</strong> origin <strong>of</strong><br />

evil ? The existence <strong>of</strong> evil was a plain fact. Was Grod<br />

<strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> it ? That could not be ; for Grod could not<br />

possibly will evil. Did it exist in spite <strong>of</strong> Him, and against<br />

His will ? That could not be for God could not ; possibly<br />

be deficient in power. Then how was its existence to be<br />

accounted for ?<br />

Now, evil is sometimes understood in a negative ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />

than in a positive sense, in <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> a defect and fall<br />

ing short, <strong>of</strong> lesser as c<strong>on</strong>trasted with greater good ; and<br />

in this sense it was not difficult to account for <strong>the</strong> existence<br />

<strong>of</strong> evil in <strong>the</strong> universe. For if we c<strong>on</strong>sidered it inc<strong>on</strong>sistent<br />

with <strong>the</strong> justice and benevolence <strong>of</strong> Grod, that He should<br />

not make everything <strong>the</strong> very best, where were we to stop<br />

in our demand ? We could not pause till we reached in<br />

our wishes <strong>the</strong> very highest point <strong>of</strong> all, and arrived at <strong>the</strong><br />

Uncreated Perfecti<strong>on</strong> itself. Wherever we stopped below<br />

this culminating point, <strong>the</strong> same charge could be urged as<br />

now, that things were not made so good as <strong>the</strong>y could be<br />

made. But a desire that tended straight to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> distincti<strong>on</strong> between <strong>the</strong> creature and Grod, and could<br />

not be satisfied but by a c<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong>, was absurd ; and a<br />

charge which would always be made, whatever <strong>the</strong> Creator<br />

might do, was untenable. The possibility, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>of</strong> things<br />

being made better argued no envy in Grod who made <strong>the</strong>m<br />

worse, and <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> evil, in <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> lesser good,<br />

was no real difficulty at all. 1<br />

1<br />

Cuilibet finite possibilis est ad- sibi debetur quam secundum deter-<br />

ditio ; sed cujuslibet creaturae b<strong>on</strong>i- urinati<strong>on</strong> em divinse voluntatis, et<br />

tas finita est. Ergo potest sibi fieri ideo nulla invidia in Deo resultat,<br />

additio, sed creatura nunquam po- si rem meliorem facere potuit quam<br />

test attingere ad sequalitatem Dei. fecerit. Aquinas, in Lomb. Dist.<br />

Nee alia mensura divinae b<strong>on</strong>itatis 43. Q. 1. A. 1.

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