Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

The Argument
CHAP. I.
describing us as acting from an irresistible influence either
for ffood or evil ; whereas we are conscious of will and
choice and feel that we are not forced to act in one way
or another. But it is replied that this objection proceeds
from a as to the nature of this irresistible
misapprehension
influence. The terms irresistible, necessary, and other like
terms, imply,
indeed, in their common use an inclination
of the will which is opposed, and express a certain over
whelming" power exerted upon the man, in consequence of
which he is obliged to act against this inclination. But
in the present
instance these terms are, in defect of proper
language for the purpose, used incorrectly, and express a
power which inclines the will itself, in the first place, and
does not suppose an inclination already formed which it
contradicts. Between our experience and consciousness,
then, and the exertion of such a power as this upon our
wills, there is no opposition. Our consciousness is only
concerned with the inclination of the will itself, beyond
which we cannot by any stretch of thought or internal
scrutiny advance, being obliged to stay at the simple point
of our will, purpose, inclinations as existing in us. But the
inclination itself of the will is the same, however it may
have been originated ; no difference therefore respecting
its origin touches the subject matter of our consciousness.
This question affects the cause, our consciousness is con
cerned only with the fact these ; two, therefore, can never
come into collision. And though in popular language
such a grace would be spoken of as obliging a man to act
in a particular way, as if it obliged hirn so to act whether
he willed or not, operating as physical force does, indepen
dent of the will of the agent altogether ; such a description
of it is incorrect, and misses the fundamental distinction
in the case. The agent is not caused by it to act in spite
of his will, but caused to will.
This general description of the structure and defence of
the doctrine of predestination will perhaps be sufficient as
an introduction to the present treatise. Nakedly stated,
the doctrine is simply paradoxical, and those who are ac
quainted with no more than the mere statement of it, are