Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. V1IJ. of Freewill. 199
But the question whether the will is free being thus
decided, the next follows, whether the man is free to will ;
which is, as has been just said, the real question at issue
between the two sides. On this question, then, he first
decides and no one will oppose him that the man is not
free in the case of any proposed action, generally and alto
gether in respect of willing ; but that he must will one
thing or another, either doing the act or abstaining from
it. Willing or volition being an action, and freedom
consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in
respect of willing or the act of volition, when an action in
his is power once proposed to his thoughts as presently to
be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very mani
for it being unavoidable that the action depending
fest ;
on his will should exist or not exist, and its existence or
not existence following perfectly the determination and
preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence
or not existence of that action it is ;
that he will the one or the other
absolutely necessary
This, then, is
evident, that in all proposals of present action, a man is
not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot for
bear willing.
It being decided, then, that the man must will one way
or another i.e. is not free to will neither way Locke
comes at last to the question, which is the only real one
between the two sides, and upon which the whole contro
versy turns Is he free to will either way ? And he settles
it thus summarily. Since, then, it is plain that in most
cases a man is not at liberty, whether he will or no, the
next thing demanded is, Whether a man be at liberty to
will which of the two he pleases ? This question carries
the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that one might
thereby be sufficiently convinced that liberty concerns not
the will. For to ask whether a man be at liberty to will
either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases,
is to ask whether a man can will what he wills, or be
pleased with what he is pleased with. A question which,
I think, needs no answer ; and they who can make a ques
tion of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts