Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

242 Scholastic Theory CHAP. rx.
was the true and genuine voluntariness of its motions at all
effected by their source being external. For the Supreme
Mover did not, by setting natural causes in motion, hinder
the acts in which such causes issued from being natural ;
no more, when He set in motion the voluntary causes, did
He hinder the acts in which they issued from being volun
tary. Rather He Himself caused in these acts their
voluntariness, and their naturalness respectively, working
in each nature according to its peculiarity inunoquoque
operans secundum ejus proprietatem. 1
And this consideration supplied the answer to the ques
tion how our wills could be moved from without, and yet
feel no force, no constraint, but all its motions go on ex
actly as if they originated in ourselves. There were two
kinds of necessity, the necessity of force, and the necessity
of nature or inclination. The necessity of force was vi
termini opposed to inclination, and if it prevailed, pre
vailed in spite of it. and was attended with the sensation
to the man of being forced or obliged to do a thing. But
the necessitv of inclination, or that which made the incli
nation to be what it was, could only be felt as inclination,
not as force. For the inclination itself was to begin with
that which such necessity had made it to be ; it could
have felt nothing contrary to it, nothing violating it, in
1 Voluntas domina est sui actus, quin actiones earum sint voluntariae,
et in ipsa est velle et non velle ; sed potius hoc in eis facit ; operatur
quod non esset si non haberet in enim in unoquoque secundum ejus
potestate movere seipsam ad vo- proprietatem. Sum. Theol. l m Q,.
Jendum. 1 2 d e Q. 9. Art. 3. 83. Art. 1.
Liberum arbitrium est causa sui De ratione voluntarii est quod
motus : quia homo per liberum ar- principium ejus sit intra ; sed non
bitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. oportet quod hoc principium intrin-
Non tamen hoc est necessitate liber- secum sit primum principium non
tatis quod sit prima causa sui id motum ab alio. Unde motus volun-
quod liberum est; sicut nee ad hoc tarius, etsi habeat principium proxiquod
aliquid sit causa alterius, mum intrinsecum, tamen principium
requiritur quod sit prima causa primum est ab extra; sicut et priejus.
Deus igitur est prima causa mum principium motus naturalis est
movens et naturales causas et vo- ab extra, quod scilicet movet natu-
juntarias. Et sicut naturalibus ram. l m 2 lae Q. 9. Art. 3.
causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin Ipse actus liberi arbitrii reduciactus
earum sint naturales, ita mo- tur in Deum sicut in causam. l m*
\endo causas voluntarias, non aufert Q. 23. Art. 2.