Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

408
Note XXL
In this passage, then, we have the ground on which
Pascal claims a great distinction to be made between the
Jansenist and the Calvinist doctrine of efficacious grace ;
the ground being that while the Calvinists deny, the Jan-
senists admit le pouvoir que la volonte a de resister
meme a la grace efficace et victorieuse. Now this admis
sion is in its very form plainly and at first sight unmean
ing ; for the only admission which would carry freewill
with it would be that man could resist effectively this
grace ; and certainly no effective resistance can by the
very force of the terms be made to victorious grace/
But the true explanation of this whole argument is to be
found in a particular meaning in which the Augustinian
school understood the term power. Pascal rests the whole
claim of the Jansenists to be considered believers in free
will on their use of this word their admission that man
has the power to resist grace : Us ne savent que trop
quel homme a toujours le pouvoir de pecher et de resister
a la grace. But the Augustinian definition of power en
for
tirely nullifies this as any admission really of. freewill ;
in this definition power is defined to be potestas si vult+
But, power being thus understood, this admission leaves
the whole question of the will and its determination open,
and allows the person who makes it to maintain that,
while every one has the power to resist grace if he wills,
no one who is moved by Divine grace wills. Nor is this
meaning of the term power at all concealed in this letter,
in which Pascal expressly time after time thus qualifies
the term power, and appends to it this condition : Ce
n est pas qu il ne puisse toujours s en eloigner, et qu il ne
s en eloignat s il le voulait. Mais comment ce voudrait-il,
puisque la volonte ne se porte jamais qu a ce qui lui plait,
etc. . . . Le libre arbitre, qui peut toujours resister a la
grace, mais qui ne le veut pas. ... La grace ne blesse
pas le pouvoir qu on a de resister si on le veut. . . . Car on
peut n y pas consentir si on le veut. ... On a toujours
le pouvoir de ne consentir pas si on le veut. Pascal tells
us, then, that by man s power to resist grace is meant
power if he wills. But would Calvin object to admit