Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

Examination of the
CHAP. n.
tion that these truths must have been held in some sense
or manner which was improper ; which impropriety in the
manner of holding them has heen the reason why, however
certain themselves, they have led to such untenable results.
Let us take the case of philosophical predestination
in
the first place,
or of as
predestination resting on philoso
phical grounds, or what is ordinarily called necessitarianism
and let us examine the nature of these grounds.
or fatalism ;
It will be evident to any one at all conversant with philo
sophy, and who will summon to his mind a few instances of
the different kinds of truth, to which it calls our attention,
and which it assumes and uses in its arguments and specu
lations, that there are two very different kinds of truths
upon which philosophy proceeds one, of which the con
ception is distinct and absolute ; the other, of which the
conception is indistinct, and only incipient or in tendency.
Of ordinary facts, such as meet the senses of the facts of
our internal consciousness, our own feelings and sensations,
bodily and mental, we have distinct conceptions, so far at
least, that these are complete and absolute truths embraced
by our minds. On the other hand, there are various truths
which we partly conceive and partly fail in conceiving ; the
conception, when it has begun, does riot advance or come
to a natural termination, but remains a certain of thought only. Such are the ideas
tendency
of substance, of
cause, of infinity, and others which we cannot grasp or
subject to our minds, and which, when we follow them up,
involve us in the utmost perplexity, and carry us into
great apparent contradictions. These, as entertained by
our minds, are incipient truths, not final or absolute ones.
In following or trying to follow them, we feel that we are
in a certain right way, that we are going in a certain true
direction of thought ; but we attain no goal, and arrive
at no positive apprehension.
In contemplating material objects, I encounter a num
ber of impressions, such as hardness, softness, smoothness,
roughness, colour, which are only qualities ; but I cannot
rest in them, but push on to some substance to which they
belong, and from which it is absurd to imagine them apart.