Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

206 Augustinian
Doctrine CHAP. TUT.
Church at large does, as a mystery and with a reserve, and
to hold it as a definite and complete doctrine.
The language of S. Augustine respecting the will may
be pat under two heads ; under the first of which it does
not come up to the received doctrine of freewill, and under
the second is opposed to it.
I. First, freewill, as maintained by S. Augustine, does
not mean so much as the freewill above described, or a
self-determining will ; but only a ivill ; his language not
advancing beyond that point up to which the doctrine of
freewill and the opposite doctrine agree.
In examining the language of Augustine on this sub
ject we must take care to distinguish between what he says
of the freewill of man in his former perfect, and that of
man in his present corrupt state. In the book De Libero
Arbitrio, a freewill is indeed described which comes up to
the above definition of it as original and self-determining.
The Manichean there, not content with the fact of the
human will as accounting for moral evil in the world,
demands the cause of that will ; and Augustine replies :
The will being the cause of sin, you ask the cause of the
will : should I discover it, will you not ask then the cause
of that cause ; and what limit of inquiry can there be, if
you will go deeper than the very root ? . . . . What cause
of will can there be before will ? For either this cause is
will, and we are no nearer the root than we were before ; or
it is not will, and in that case there is no sin. 1 Here a
will is described which is truly an original agent in nature,
no cause but itself. But the will thus described is
having
the will of man in his created, not in his fallen state. 2 In
some passages, again, quoted in a former chapter, a will
was described which was self-determining and original ; for
it was said that the first man had such an assistance given
him as he could use if he willed, and neglect if he willed ;
not one by which it was caused that he did will. 3 His will,
therefore, had no cause beyond itself, or was self-caused,
1 L. 3. c. xvii. qua homo factus est loquimur.
2 Cum autem de libera voluntate L. 3. c. 18.
faciendi loquimur, de ilia scilicet in 8 De Corr. et Grat. e. xi.