Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. Till. of Freewill. 201
some sort of idea of the thing in our minds ? Locke s re
jection of this power in the will on such a ground appears
to be inconsistent with his admission of the class of indis
tinct ideas ? * For if we admit such a kind and order of
truths, we are arbitrarily to exclude such a truth as this
from the benefit of it a truth which is felt and asserted
by the great mass of mankind ? But this is the line which
Locke takes on this question. He sees there is no distinct
idea of originality or self-determination in the human
mind ; and he does not allow such an idea a place as an
indistinct one. He thus rests ultimately in the simple
fact of will, as the whole of the truth of the freedom of
c
the will. For how can we think any one freer, than to
have the power to do what he will ? . . . . We can scarce
tell how to imagine any being freer than to be able to do
what he wills. 2
It must be added, that important results in theology
follow the decision of this question respecting the will, one
way or another. On the supposition of a self-determining
power in the will, and so far as it is a true one, the Divine
justice is freed from all substantial difficulty
evil is brought instantly home to the individual, who is
made responsible for it, and so justly subject to punish
ment. But deny this power, and suppose the will to be
moved from without, and the Divine justice is imme
diately challenged, and we are involved in whatever diffi
culty accompanies the depravation of moral beings from a
source external to themselves, and their punishment when
their depravation has proceeded from such a source. I am
speaking of the latter doctrine as held definitely
or exclu
sively.
It may be said, indeed, that the will which is thus
moved from without is still will, the will of the individual,
that it has all the properties which we can distinctly
; for moral
conceive of will ; but these characteristics of will will not
prevent the difficulties which arise from this theory of its
motion or determination,. And this perhaps is worth the
consideration of those who not so much deny the selfdetermining
power of the will, as set the question aside as
1 NOTE IV. .* Essay, book 2. c. 21. s. 21.