Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

298 Conclusion. CHAP. XT,
class of intellects that, not satisfied with the vague first-
sight impressions and notions of things, follow them up to
that ultimate point at which they are plainly seen to be
either true or false, that draw the contents of the mind
from their obscurity to the test of an actual examination,
that see clearly the truth they do see, whether as simply
apprehended, or as extracted from other truth ; these
minds, in proportion to the keenness with which they are
conscious of perceiving truth, when they do perceive it,
know that they have got hold of it, and that no power can
wrest it from them, in proportion, i.e.* to the measure in
which, in the department of knowledge, they are filled
with the light of clear apprehension or demonstrative rea
soning, see the distinction between this mode of percep
tion and that which awaits them when they leave the
scientific ground, and turn from the truths of knowledge
to those of faith and of religion. They see, in consequence
of their appreciation of final truth, so much the more
clearly the defect of that which is not final ; and that
which has come to a point contrasts the more strongly,
with that which comes to none, but which vanishes and is
gone before it reaches a conclusion ; ever beginning, ever
tending to some goal, but never attaining it ; stopping
short, as it does, at its very starting, and, in the very act
of progress, absorbed in the atmosphere of obscurity, which
limits our mental view. Then, under the influence of such
a contrast, it is, that, the reason pauses, stops to consider,
to reflect, and then says to itself this is ignorance.
And these considerations, while they serve to explain
why more have not attained to an accurate knowledge of
their own ignorance, as human creatures, than appear to
have done, serve, also, to temper our regret at such a
deficiency ; for it must be seen, on the bare description of
such a deep and peculiar perception of ignorance as I am
now referring to, that it is a state of mind not unattended
by danger. No perception of ignorance, indeed, however
strong, can be charged with any legitimate tendency to
produce unbelief; for it does not follow that, because we
see some truths clearly and others obscurely, some finally