Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

CHAP. HI. The Pelagian Controversy. 65
state being the thing we attend to independent of any
source from which it may have sprung. The system of
trial and probation under which we are placed is thus to
some extent a modified one ;
not throw ng us 1
wholly upon
ourselves, to work our way up to the virtuous character by
the power of the mere will, but more or less,
tions, endowing
and in por
us with it, and producing in us to begin
with the ultimate forms of moral being.
And it is proper, as a further answer to the Pelagian
confined idea of virtue, to add, that no exact limit is, to
the eye of reason apparent, to the operation
power
of such a
of infusing virtue into the human soul. It would
undoubtedly be something like a contradiction to suppose
that the distinctive effect of trial could be obtained without
trial as the cause, and it must be granted that there must be
some ultimate difference in favour of that virtue which is,
over that which is not, the effect of trial.
other apparent goal to an untried virtue.
But there is no
We know that
a certain excitement of the feelings produces a pleasure in
virtue, and that particular circumstances, junctures, appeals
from without, act with an exciting power upon the feelings,
kindling zeal, enthusiasm, and love. But this being the
case, it is impossible to say to what extent this system of
impulse and excitement existing in our constitution might
what duration these conditions of mind are in
be carried ;
themselves capable of, and whether they might not be
made, by Divine power applying a fit machinery and suc
cession of exciting causes, permanent. We only know
that such a system would not serve that particular end for
which the present system of trial is designed.
But the Pelagian was further wrong. As trial is not
the necessary condition of all goodness, so it is not the
necessary condition of the highest kind of goodness always.
The system of probation points according to the reason of
the case, to its own termination. It is designed for an
end ; but the end, when attained, implies the cessation of
the means. There is a plain incongruity in the perfected
being remaining still dependent on a contingent will, and
for ever on his trial. A
exposed to moral risk ; i.e. being
F