Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

Examination of the
CHAP. ir.
actions included. Kegarding actions in their general cha
racter as events, we say they must have a cause but in their
;
special character as actions, we refuse them one : our whole
internal feeling and consciousness being opposed to it.
Here then are two contradictory instincts or perceptions
of our reason, which we must make the best of, and arrive
at what measure of truth a mixed conclusion gives. We
certainly have both these and one must not be
perceptions,
made to give way to the other. However reason may de
clare for the originality of our acts, it says also that every
event must have a cause ; again, however it may declare
for a cause of every event, it says that our acts are original.
Metaphysicians on both sides appear to have under
valued the one or the other of these rational instincts or
perceptions, according to their bias ; the advocates of free
will thinking slightly of the general instinct for a cause, the
advocates of necessity thinking slightly
of our perception, as
agents, of originality. The former have simply dwelt on
our inward consciousness of power of choice, dismissing the
principle of causes, as if, however, it applied to other events,
it did not apply to actions, being excluded from this ground
ipso facto by this sense of the originality
of our actions.
But if the necessity of a cause of events is true at all, it
must apply to actions as well as to other events ; and to
suppose that it is ipso facto deprived of this application
by this special sense of originality in the case of actions, is
to assume that we cannot have two contradictory ideas ;
which, according
to what I endeavoured to show in this
chapter, is a false assumption, and not true of us in the pre
sent imperfect state of our capacities, in which we may have,
it is of
and have, imperfect opposing perceptions ; though
course absurd to suppose that this can be the case except
in a very imperfect state of being, or that there can be
absolute and perfect perceptions in opposition to each other.
The latter, on the other hand, have regarded the principle
of causation as the only premiss worth taking into account
on this question, and have dismissed the sense of originality,
as if it were a mere confused and blind sentiment, which,
when examined, really spoke to nothing, and was found to