Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

33 2 Note V.
proceeding from our consciousness of freedom as agents ;
an objection which Mr. Mill meets with a distinction be
tween necessity in the sense of causation, and necessity in
the common use of the term, viz. as coaction or force ;
necessity in the former sense not being opposed to our con
sciousness. The same answer is contained in the follow
ing passage : The metaphysical theory of freewill as held
by philosophers (for the practical feeling of it, common in
a greater or less degree to all mankind, is in no way in
consistent with the contrary theory) was invented because
the supposed alternative of admitting human actions to be
necessary was deemed inconsistent with every one s instinc
tive consciousness, as well as humiliating to the pride and
degrading to the moral nature of man. Nor do I deny
that the doctrine, as sometimes held, is open to these im
putations ; for the misapprehension in which I shall be
able to show that they originate, is unfortunately not con
fined to the opponents of the doctrine, but participated in
by many, perhaps we might say by most, of its sup
porters. Vol. ii. p. 405.
Now, it must be admitted that the doctrine of neces
sity is not opposed to any express and distinct conscious
ness on our part, for all that we are distinctly anxious of
is our willing itself ; we have no positive apprehension or
perception of anything beyond that fact, i.e. of the source
of such willing, whether this is in ourselves, or beyond and
outside of us. But though we have no distinct apprehen
sion of our own originality as agents, is there not an in
stinctive perception in that direction ? Does not the
whole manner in which we find ourselves, willing and
choosing, debating between conflicting lines of action, and
then deciding on one or other of them, lead us towards an
idea of our own originality as agents, and produce that
impression upon us ? Would not any person, holding to
his natural impression on this head, be disappointed by
any explanation of these characteristics of human action,
which accounted for them on any rationale short of
originality ? Would he not feel that there was something
passed over, not duly acknowledged, and recognised, in