Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

252 Scholastic Theory CHAP. ix.
virtue of another may be set off ? The spectator may de
rive benefit from the contrast, but there is another whose
interests are quite as important as his.
And the same may be said of the use of which the
moral evil in the world is, for the trial, purification, and
confirmation of the good. The wickedness of the bad
portion of mankind is indeed one of the principal means
by which the good portion is educated and disciplined ;
the pride and tyranny of one man serve to produce the
virtue of patience in another; the wrongs of the world
subdue and temper, its corruptions and temptations fortify,
those minds that are disposed to make this use of them.
But though the schoolman appeals to this effect of moral
evil as a j ustification of its
1
existence, such an argument
that one
admits of the obvious answer, that it is not just
man should be wicked in order that another should be good.
The argument of variety, however, was put in another
form, and another explanation extracted from it. The
principle of variety demanded that there should be differ
ent natures in the universe ; and that, besides such natures
as were subject to necessary laws, there should be other
nobler ones possessing will. But this conceded, moral evil,
it was said, followed. For such natures as the latter must,
as the very condition of this higher good, have the power
of going wrong and receding from the end designed for
them ; and, with the power to do so, the fact would in
some instances take place. 2
Now, this is a substantially
Si enim omnia mala impedi- naturam, quod est voluntas, quod
rentur,multabonadeessent universe; quanto vicinius est Deo, tanto a
rion enim esset vita leonis, si non necessitate naturalium causarum
esset occisio animalium ; nee esset magis
est liberum. . . . Et ideo
patientia martyrum si non esset per- taliter a Deo instituta est ut deficere
secutio tyrannorum. Sum. Theol. posset. ... Si autem inevitabiliter
l ma Q. 22. A, 2. in finem tenderet per divinam
Multa bona tollerentur, si Deus
nullum malum permitteret esse ;
non enim generaretur ignis nisi
providentiam tolleretur sibi conditio
suse naturae. In Lomb. 1. 1. Dist.
39. Q. 2. A. 2.
corrumperetur aer; neque conser- Perfectio Universi requirit ut
varetur vita leonis, nisi occideretur sint qusedam quse a bonitate deficere
asinus. Q,. 48. A. 2. possint : ad quod sequitur
2
Sed.in nobilioribus creaturis
ea interdnm
deficere. Sum. Theol. I 01* Q.
invenitur aliud principium prater 48. A. 2.