Mozley: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of

8o The Pelagian Controversy. CHAP. in.
but positive depravity, certainly the general fact of sin in
this sense cannot be accounted for on the mere principle
of contingency. Supposing ourselves calculating before
hand the result of the action of freewill in the human race,
we should have no more right to calculate on general de
pravity and wickedness as the result, than on general piety
and virtue. Undoubtedly there is this important distinc
tion between vice and virtue, that vice is pleasant, and
virtue painful at the time ; and it maybe thought perhaps
that, in making any calculations beforehand as to the con
duct of mankind, we should be justified in expecting that
the generality would do what was easiest at the time. But
if anyone will examine the real ground on which he forms
this expectation, he will find that he forms it upon the
experience of the result, and not upon any ground of
antecedent calculation. He sees that this is the general
way in which mankind act, and, therefore, he imagines
himself expecting it beforehand. But it is evident that,
in calculating the conduct of mankind beforehand, we
should have no more right to calculate on a general pre
ference of present to future interests, than on a general
contrary preference. The choice that freewill would make
in the matter would be as probable one way as another.
Understanding sin, then, in the sense of depravity and
wickedness, the general fact of human sinfulness in this
sense certainly requires some law of sin in our nature as its
explanation ; such a law as is asserted in the doctrine of
original sin. But while such a fact must be allowed as a
proof of the doctrine of original sin, it must at the same
time be remembered, that the assertion of general depravity
and wickedness is a very grave assertion to make respecting
the human race. It is an assertion, however, which rests
on a ground of actual observation and experience, confirmed
by the authority of Scripture, and is true in two different
ways.
First, every man is depraved in the sense of having
vile, selfish, and proud desires, which have a certain power
over him, and occupy and fill his mind with sufficient
strength and frequency to constitute a depraved condition