Educing Information: Interrogation - National Intelligence University

generally sound tactics from the beginning. [T]he second and
related purpose of screening is to permit an educated guess
about the source’s probable attitude toward the interrogation.
An estimate of whether the interrogatee will be cooperative
or recalcitrant is essential to planning because very different
methods are used in dealing with these two types. It is
recommended that screening be conducted whenever personnel
and facilities permit. 49
In strategic and operational settings, where depth and accuracy of information
take precedence over timeliness, screening is a critical component of the
overall interrogation process. Every effort must be made not only to assess the
knowledgeability and cooperation of the source, but — of supreme importance
— to vet the individual in a manner that provides the interrogator with a high
degree of confidence in the source’s identity.
This point, while seemingly obvious, has proven anything but in the course
of current interrogation operations. From the detention center in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, to various interrogation facilities in Iraq,
reports abound of prisoners held in detention and interrogated at length because
of mistaken identification. Several factors contribute to this unfortunate situation,
including difficulties in transcribing names from Arabic, Pashto, and Urdu into
English; classic cross-cultural misunderstandings; and a high-threat operating
environment that leads many to err on the side of capture rather than release.
Whatever the causative factor, properly conducted screening operations
can make a significant contribution on two important fronts. First, from a
counterinsurgency perspective, false identification and internment can inflame
an already tenuous relationship between an occupying power and the indigenous
population. The false imprisonment of even a single individual can cause a
profound shift in the insurgent/counterinsurgent dynamic as evidenced by the
French experience in Indochina and Algeria and the U.S. experience in Vietnam
and Iraq. Each instance of mistaken imprisonment, especially if it involves some
form of mistreatment, shifts those who previously supported the foreign presence
toward a more neutral position, those who formerly were neutral may begin to
support the insurgents, and the insurgents may adopt a more militant campaign,
one made all the more robust by a sudden influx of new supporters and combatants.
This untoward cascading effect can be relatively simple to prevent through the
establishment of a vigorous screening program that systematically filters out the
innocent while identifying those of genuine intelligence interest.
Second, from an interrogation perspective, a proper screening effort helps
to ensure the efficient allocation of available assets — interrogators, interpreters,
and analysts — to those sources with the greatest potential knowledgeability. As
one historical example, the U.S. strategic interrogation program in place during
World War II (MIS-Y) employed a multi-tiered screening process that required
49
KUBARK, 30–33.
107