Educing Information: Interrogation - National Intelligence University

source about whether he can and wants to maintain silence or maintain his cover
story. The source, in turn, would want to sow doubt in the mind of the interrogator
as to whether he knows anything useful and whether he will ever speak.
In an emergency situation there might be very little time to try to change
someone’s mind; in trying to educe information against a tight deadline (the
“ticking bomb” scenario) the United States would have no fallback position. In
negotiations terms, the BATNA power of the source would be great and that of the
United States correspondingly weak. Alternatives in this situation would depend
on knowing or guessing what matters to the individual and using that information
according to a strategic plan. In such a situation it might be especially important
to focus on the goal (obtaining accurate and useful information) without such
“distractions” as the wish to vent frustration or punish the source.
In the war against terrorism any person willing and able to commit suicide
would have a near-perfect BATNA — the strongest in the world in resisting the
use of force. The United States would need to build a fallback position. Even in
the face of detainees’ willingness and ability to commit suicide, many sources
of power might yet be effective if there were time to use them: for example,
mobilizing any imam who opposes the use of violence or citing a fatwa that does
so, applying rewards and sanctions judiciously, instituting a tenacious and longterm
effort to win friends for the United States, and “building community” (a
careful long-term plan to gain — and deserve — moral authority).
For Effectiveness: Prepare, Prepare, Prepare
Several basic tasks seem essential for effectiveness in every strategy in an EI
negotiation:
• Taking note of the relevant parties whose interests are at stake;
• Discovering – or at least developing working hypotheses about — the
tangible and intangible interests of each party;
• Evaluating the sources of power available to each side in EI;
• Developing relevant options for interrogation, and “fallback” options;
• Planning strategy, style, and sequencing of tactics with the EI team;
• Planning the role of each team member (for example, intake and
preliminary assessment, interrogation, analysis behind the scenes,
integration of data into and from the relevant intelligence community
database, on-going evaluation and guidance to educers, and the users of
information, and collection of records that can be analyzed for improved
knowledge and practice).
The first two tasks need special care.
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