Educing Information: Interrogation - National Intelligence University

Actions Away From the Negotiation Table
A second class of distributional moves is conducted away from the table,
independent of interaction with the other party. If used effectively, these moves can
significantly enhance a negotiator’s power. Two such moves include improving
one’s “BATNA” and making irrevocable commitments.
Improving Your BATNA
Negotiation power is largely defined by the strength of one’s alternatives to
negotiating. If negotiations with a counterpart should fail, what is one’s walk-away
alternative The best alternative is known as the BATNA — Best Alternative To a
Negotiated Agreement (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991). The better one’s BATNA,
the more power one has in a negotiation. It becomes easier to negotiate with
confidence, or to walk away from the negotiation without feeling confined by the
other party’s demands.
Negotiators can improve their BATNA by thinking carefully about it and
by brainstorming possible alternatives. Ultimately, a negotiator may decide that
his or her BATNA is not especially strong, an important realization that gives
the negotiator additional incentive to negotiate carefully and effectively, perhaps
accommodating more than would generally be wise.
Making an educated guess about the other side’s BATNA can help a negotiator
understand how strongly motivated the other party will be to reach agreement. If
their BATNA is poor, they might be amenable to many options. If their BATNA is
strong, they might decide to stand firm to reap maximal concessions. Sometimes
parties overestimate their BATNA; to improve leverage in this type of situation, a
negotiator might cast doubt on the strength of the other’s BATNA.
Negotiators often use time pressure to influence the behavior of another party,
yet this is only persuasive if the other party’s BATNA would worsen after the
deadline passes. If the BATNA is strong, time pressure is minimally persuasive.
Negotiators who use time pressure would also be well advised to keep their own
BATNA in mind, since a deadline for the other is also a deadline for themselves.
Making Irrevocable Commitments
Threats suggest a future action that one might take if the other party does
not comply with one’s demands. In contrast, an irrevocable commitment involves
an action that we have already begun (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994). To avoid
being hurt by the action, the other party must change behavior. Schelling uses
the hypothetical example of two drivers speeding toward one another in a game
of “chicken,” each testing who will swerve off the road first. A driver could throw
the steering wheel out the window in full view of the other, thus creating an
irrevocable commitment (Schelling, 1960).
With an irrevocable commitment, the locus of control shifts from the actor
to the respondent, who now has the ability to stop an unwelcome event from
happening. For this reason, it is advisable that an educer using “irrevocable”
commitments actually have some way of reversing them, since it is quite possible
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