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Educing Information: Interrogation - National Intelligence University

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to be “heard,” or become lonely in detention, and tell more than they originally<br />

intended. Some may be motivated by false information that can be refuted. Some<br />

may be trained to resist certain sources of power that might be used in EI, but<br />

understanding the training methods may indicate ways of sowing doubt in that<br />

training.<br />

Another reason to know the interests of a source is to understand what<br />

negotiation theory refers to as a “resistance point”: a point at which the source<br />

changes his mind in an important way about dealing with the educer. This could<br />

be the point at which the source will stop dealing with his captors and seek other<br />

alternatives, such as trying to injure himself seriously, persuade someone else to<br />

injure him, or commit suicide. A source might have a resistance point of a different<br />

kind; that is, a point at which the source will decide to share — or appear to share<br />

— important information. The educer would obviously benefit from discovering<br />

this latter resistance point in order to try to move it toward cooperation. (The<br />

educer might endeavor to lower the resistance point by causing the source to<br />

doubt his own assessments, either about the United States or about his interests.)<br />

To identify something to trade the educer would need to know what the<br />

source would value: for example, changing aspects of the EI sessions, conditions<br />

of custody, contacts with family, or time of release. EI interactions might present<br />

numerous opportunities to offer something of value — tangible or intangible —<br />

that involves little or no cost to U.S. interests. And if the source accepts something<br />

of value, this might also mean that he now might stand to lose something if he<br />

were to stop being helpful.<br />

Few sources would be unique: each belongs to a religious group, a political<br />

group, and an ethnic culture. He may belong to an extended family. How one<br />

interacts with an individual source may be, de facto, part of a much larger<br />

“negotiation” with all the others in his immediate group, and potentially with<br />

all the people around the world who identify with the source. Members of the<br />

source’s ethnic or religious group may also be at the site of the negotiation, which<br />

means the question of “negotiating with the constituency” is close at hand. The<br />

willingness of a source to give information might depend in important ways on<br />

the attitudes of a group of sources and might require that the source be separated<br />

from other sources. Alternatively, a group of sources might include people from<br />

different backgrounds whose interests at least initially differ. Such differences<br />

among the sources might advance U.S. interests if the United States could develop<br />

a coalition with one or another group.<br />

The Need for Research about Negotiations and EI<br />

The founders of modern-day negotiation theory, Walton and McKersie,<br />

developed their theory by studying records of negotiations. 689 This type of study<br />

could easily be extended to EI. Existing records of EI sessions, including debriefs<br />

689<br />

Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (Beverly<br />

Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1965).<br />

301

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