The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

86 THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE
eleven xymbouloi, "advisers," with orders "to share in the conduct of
affairs in whatever way should be best.""
The dispatch of xymbouloi to oversee the actions of an unsuccessful
general was not unprecedented. Twice the brilliant Brasidas had been
sent to bolster disappointing naval commanders, once alone and once
with two companions," but the closest parallel is with the ten advisers
that were attached to Agis after his failure to fight in the Argive plain
in 418 had led to the fall of Orchomenus. Without their consent the
king could not lead the army out of the city, and they kept a close
watch on him in the field. 74 The leader of the eleven advisers sent to
Astyochus was the rich, famous, and influential Lichas, an Olympic
victor in the chariot race and a man of important diplomatic experience
who was certain to overshadow the navarch. 75 The board's powers
were even greater than the usual ones of advice and oversight with
which Agis had been threatened. Lichas and the other xymbouloi were
empowered to depose Astyochus, if they saw fit, and replace him with
Antisthenes. All of this may be attributed to the suspicion created by
Pedaritus' letter, but there were further orders that must have stemmed
from a more fundamental change of opinion in Sparta. The xymbouloi
were to take as many of the ships with which they came and of the
Peloponnesian ships already in lonia as they chose, place them under
the command of Clearchus the son of Ramphias who was with them,
and send this force to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont."
These last orders represented a fundamental change in strategy,
shifting the focus of the war from Ionia to the Hellespont. The decision
to support Chios had been made under the influence of Endius and
Alcibiades, but by late November or early December of 412 the former
was no longer ephor, the latter had abandoned the Spartan cause for
the court of the Persian satrap, and their strategy no longer seemed
attractive. Chios was besieged, begging for help, and, apparently, on
the verge of surrender. Tissaphernes was proving to be a slippery ally
who negotiated humiliating and unsatisfactory treaties, did not meet
his financial obligations, used the Spartan forces for his own purposes,
and warmly received the double renegade Alcibiades. Those Spartans
who had originally favored collaboration with Phamabazus in the He!-
72
Arrival: 8.41.1; orders: 39.2.
nTo Cnemus in 429 (2 .85 .1) and to Alcidas in 427 (J.69.1).
745.63+
75 0n Lichas, see HCT V, 85; and Kagan, Peace of Nicias, 75-76, IJ4-IJ5.
768·39·2.